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9 A Perspective on the Effects of 
NAFTA on Korea 
Honggue Lee 
9.1 Introduction 
A free trade agreement (FTA) has significant implications for trade and in- 
vestment flows in and out of the free trade area, as it reshapes the conditions of 
competition between member countries and outsiders. A regional preferential 
arrangement can induce the replacement of a higher-cost source in one mem- 
ber with a lower-cost source in another member, resulting in trade creation. On 
the other hand, a preferential arrangement often gives rise to the replacement of 
a more efficient source in a nonmember with a higher-cost source in a member, 
causing trade diversion. The members of the agreement are concerned with the 
net effect of trade creation and trade diversion. For member countries, prefer- 
ential liberalization will improve welfare if trade creation exceeds trade diver- 
sion. By contrast, nonmembers are mostly concerned with the trade diversion 
effect. Trade diversion arises when an FTA generates a change in relative prices 
between the products originating in member countries and products originating 
in nonmember countries and a switching of import sources from relatively 
more efficient nonmembers to preferentially treated member suppliers. Non- 
members also worry about an increase in the level of protection against them 
by member countries. Often, the removal of trade barriers within large markets 
results in the raising of the actual or potential barrier against the outside world. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an “expanded’ free 
trade agreement in the sense that it goes beyond the conventional reduction of 
tariffs and nontariff bamers. On top of dealing with general market access, 
NAFTA addressed an array of domestic policy issues ranging from local con- 
tent requirements to rules of origin, competition policies, intellectual property 
rights, dispute settlement mechanisms, and foreign direct investment. As such, 
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NAFTA could have both negative and positive effects on the rest of the world. 
Negative effects could stem from the diversion of trade and investment away 
from countries that do not belong to NAFTA. Negative effects would escalate 
into “trade suppression” should the agreement result in higher levels of protec- 
tion against outsiders. On the other hand, positive effects could result from 
accelerated growth within the three NAFTA partners. The “growth dividend” 
of NAFTA could offset the agreement’s discriminatory effect in the long run. 
According to preliminary studies on the effects of NAFTA, the overall net 
effect for the rest of the world is relatively insignificant (see Primo Braga 1992 
for details). NAFTA is not likely to have a serious impact on nonmember coun- 
tries as far as trade flows are concerned. Moreover, the completion of the Uru- 
guay Round is expected to mitigate the diversion effect of NAFTA. For 
instance, the average tariff rate of the United States, which stayed around 
5 percent, is to be cut by one-third as the result of the Uruguay Round trade 
talks. This additional cut in tariff rates will reduce the discriminatory effect 
of preferential liberalization in North America. For another instance, bilateral 
quotas negotiated under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) umbrella are to 
be phased out over 10 years after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This 
reform will lessen the discriminatory effect of eliminating quotas on Mexico 
against nonmember countries. 
Despite the small aggregate effect, however, the effects on specific sectors 
or individual countries could be significant. While NAFTA is a movement to- 
ward “freer” trade among its partners, it does not imply free trade within North 
America. Several nontariff barriers at the sectoral level will remain in the form 
of new rules designed for the benefit of member countries. Consequently, com- 
panies in those sectors where rules of origin or local content requirements are 
applied in a discriminatory fashion could be susceptible to severe losses re- 
sulting from trade diversion. 
At the same time, the (trade and investment) diversion effects of NAFTA 
are likely to be felt differently among nonmember countries. NAFTA is based 
on the experience of CUSFTA (the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement) or 
the terms of accession of Mexico to CUSFTA. Countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean have shown less concern with the discriminatory effects of 
NAFTA, as they are more interested in the prospective Western Hemisphere 
Free Trade Area. By contrast, members of the US.-Caribbean Basin Initiative 
have been concerned with trade diversion, as their existing preferences could 
be eroded by NAFTA. Outside the Western Hemisphere, it is hard to identify 
the immediate “victims” of the discriminatory effects of NAFTA. Neither the 
European Union nor developing countries in Asia and Africa show great con- 
cern. Only the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) and Japan seem to 
be directly concerned about the possibilities of trade and investment diversion. 
NAFTA’s effects on nonmember countries will depend on the pattern of their 
international specialization. For instance, the diversion of trade and investment 
away from Japan will be different from that away from Korea: Japan’s special- 
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ization pattern is less like Mexico’s than Korea’s is; hence, Korea is more sus- 
ceptible to the diversion effect than Japan. Like most industrialized economic 
partners of NAFTA that specialize in technology-intensive industries, Japan is 
less likely to be affected by Mexico’s accession in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Area. On the other hand, Korea’s concern with NAFTA has to do with its po- 
tential or actual “rivalry” with Mexico in the U.S. market. Many of Korea’s 
major export items compete with Mexican products in the U.S. market. In view 
of the role that the United States has played as an outlet for Korean exports, 
Korea has reason to worry about the emergence of a potentially discrimina- 
tory NAFTA. 
Most adverse impacts of NAFTA for nonmembers are felt through trade 
diversion. Yet the main message of quantitative studies focusing on NAFTA 
highlights the importance of capital flows in determining the impact of NAFTA 
on both members and nonmembers. In particular, barriers to capital flows, in- 
cluding the cost of international financing, are expected to play a much larger 
role in shaping NAFTA’s welfare effects than its preferential trade liberaliza- 
tion components (see Primo Braga et al. 1994). 
While NAFTA consolidates a prior trend toward increased intraregional in- 
vestment between the three countries, it also encourages inward direct invest- 
ment from outside the region. Multinational firms from nonmember countries 
invest in North America in order to exploit the growth prospects of an enlarged 
market and to escape latent trade barriers. Despite recent economic turbulence 
resulting from its macroeconomic mismanagement, Mexico is likely to benefit 
from the increased confidence of investors in the expanded North American 
market. The projected capacity of intended investment well exceeds domestic 
demand. Many investments from outside are suspected of taking advantage of 
Mexico and Canada as export platforms from which to serve the North Ameri- 
can market. Yet, other investments are being made to gain access to the Mexi- 
can market. 
In the following, the diversion effects of NAFTA are discussed in relation 
to Korea’s trade performance. In particular, the extent of trade diversion associ- 
ated with NAFTA is investigated with regard to competition between Korea 
and Mexico in the U.S. market. For that purpose, a series of economic indica- 
tors, which draws on partial equilibrium analyses of competition between Ko- 
rea and Mexico, is examined. 
9.2 Korea’s Economic Ties with NAFTA Members 
9.2.1 Trade Relations 
Exports and Imports 
The amount of trade flow between Korea and NAFTA members started r i s -  
ing rapidly in the early 1980s. It surpassed $30 billion in 1988 ($34 billion), 
peaked at $38 billion in 1991, and has stayed at $37 billion since then. While 
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Table 9.1 Korean Exports (billion U.S. dollars) 
United 
Year NAFTA Japan ECll  APECll States Canada Mexico 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1.682186 
2.756692 
3.312916 
4.280469 
4.656868 
4.868155 
6.035316 
6.602964 
8.792832 
11.234928 
11.886684 
15.003972 
19.594209 
23.135853 
22.766880 
21.455263 
20.804532 
20.456137 
20.37781 I 
0.999604 
1.463806 
1.5 18486 
2.05 1529 
2.642944 
2.38299 1 
2.739962 
2.693962 
2.689189 
3.8089 12 
3.766509 
4.366943 
7.058927 
10.321734 
11.841780 
10.959775 
10.909689 
10.145717 
10.27 1920 
0.729258 
1.101 120 
1.341487 
1.817312 
2.301 39 1 
2.602920 
2.657748 
2.79594 1 
2.991 306 
3.192705 
3.111112 
4.173768 
6.488212 
7.992441 
7.25462 1 
8.721625 
9.57961 8 
9.114189 
9.323735 
0.416475 
0.631974 
0.755377 
1.058086 
1.4796 17 
2.310194 
2.746709 
2.680638 
2.639403 
3.275508 
3.610784 
3.826197 
5.310175 
8.322185 
9.527817 
11.395328 
14.125746 
20.089892 
24.011579 
1.480498 
2.433963 
3.0021 17 
3.943307 
4.246108 
4.48 1955 
5.505332 
6.11 8009 
8.114244 
10.338910 
10.634998 
13.709028 
18.01 3200 
21.168185 
20.432270 
19.172382 
18.369764 
17.94 1072 
18.003603 
0. I96794 
0.3 13542 
0.297261 
0.326047 
0.386378 
0.341536 
0.480015 
0.44 1977 
0.627750 
0.876695 
1,225603 
1.244287 
1,447860 
1.688199 
1.872945 
1.724817 
1.661005 
1.608600 
1.376907 
0.004894 
0.009187 
0.013539 
0.01 11 15 
0.024381 
0.044663 
0.049970 
0.042978 
0.050838 
0.0 19323 
0.026083 
0.050657 
0.133149 
0.279470 
0.461665 
0.558064 
0.773763 
0.906465 
0.997301 
Source: Korea Customs Research Institute, Statisticnl Yearbook of Foreign Trade (Seoul, 1995). 
Korea has maintained a strong economic relationship with the United States, 
its relationship with the other NAFTA members has been less substantial. The 
amount of trade flow (exports plus imports) between Korea and the other two 
NAFTA countries was less than $1 billion until 1983 (see tables 9.1 and 9.2). 
Korea’s major exports to North American markets are household electronic 
goods, industrial electronics (including semiconductors), textiles and apparel, 
machinery, and footwear. Korea’s major imports from North America include 
agricultural products, chemical products, metal products, and machinery. The 
United States constitutes the second largest source of imports for Korea. Yet 
its share began to decline recently as a result of a rapid increase in the import 
share garnered by Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries. The Asian NIEs and 
ASEAN countries as a group are becoming a major source of imports (see 
table 9.2).’ 
Korea’s market share in North America peaked in 1988; however, it began 
to decrease as products made in China and Southeast Asian countries rushed 
into these markets. This decline of Korea’s market share is attributable to a 
1. The import market share of Asian NIEs has been increasing as more electric machinery and 
industrial electronic devices and parts are being imported from these countries. The import market 
share of ASEAN has increased as imports of raw materials have expanded. Australia’s import 
market share has also been on the rise as the result of an increase in demand for nonferrous metals 
and other raw materials. China’s share increased abruptly in 1991 to account for 5.7 percent of 
total imports. (China’s share was insubstantial in the 1980s.) 
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Table 9.2 Korean Imports (billion U.S. dollars) 
-~ ~~ 
United 
Year NAFTA Japan ECll APECll States Canada Mexico 
1975 1.003345 2.395788 0.539375 0.319125 0.876854 0.124520 0.001971 
1976 1.018761 3.031103 0.647458 0.281972 0.951402 0.066805 0.000553 
1977 1.3348 10 3.867749 0.786231 0.385788 1.248787 0.085017 0.001006 
1978 1.761153 5.895952 1.365201 0.631397 1.620344 0.133945 0.006864 
1979 2.961535 6.481254 2.072619 0.879439 2.759888 0.195174 0.006472 
1980 2.874717 5.622481 1.544028 1.251654 2.636908 0.224002 0.013807 
1981 3.546411 5.966598 1.875969 1.684179 3.204788 0.321262 0.020360 
1982 4.288328 5.123092 1,702774 2.126466 3.806494 0.246683 0.235151 
1983 4.391132 6.075369 2.121939 2.371375 4.009561 0.209124 0.172447 
1984 5.147443 7.478236 2.703215 3.034364 4.673832 0.300976 0.172635 
1985 4.916301 7.372691 2.966435 3.249493 4.514586 0.288706 0.113009 
1986 5.032281 10.714075 3.064150 2.466605 4.553151 0.332956 0.146175 
1987 6.734879 14.034761 4.733229 3.613989 6.167769 0.436490 0.130620 
1988 10.524139 15.953447 5.979241 4.779502 9.619804 0.729283 0.175053 
1989 14.207214 17.610135 6.513836 6.314504 13.044830 1.033606 0.128779 
1990 14.174441 17.829387 7.929549 8.674053 13.099968 0.846514 0.227958 
1991 17.059077 20.229941 9.284450 8.178432 15.747200 1.109908 0.201969 
1992 16.268878 18.635443 9.001606 11,373990 15.211794 0.907984 0.149100 
1993 16.306717 19.325485 9.601873 11.942687 15.236629 0.939183 0.130904 
Source: Korea Customs Research Institute, Srurisricul Yearbook ojForeign Trade (Seoul, 1995). 
recession in the United States and Korea’s loss of competitiveness. At the same 
time, Korea’s trade surpluses triggered protectionist pressure from the United 
States. (Korea had continuously recorded trade surpluses with NAFTA coun- 
tries.) However, Korea’s market share loss in North America has been supple- 
mented by its market share gains in the Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries due 
to Korea’s market diversification efforts and the economic growth of these 
countries. 
Structure of Interdependence 
The relative intensities of Korea’s trade linkages with NAFTA countries de- 
lineate a structure of interdependence between Korea and NAFTA. These in- 
tensities are often expressed in terms of gravity coefficients (or trade intensity 
indexes). The gravity coefficients summarize each country’s bias toward its 
trade partners. One version of gravity coefficients can be obtained from the 
ratio of an exporter’s share in a given market to its share in a given region, 
which can be expressed as follows: 
where i and j denote the origin and the destination, respectively, and x the 
volume of trade. 
The coefficients have been calculated for the Asia Pacific economies with a 
Table 9.3 Gravity Coefficients of APEC Countries in 1986 (import) 
Destination 
China Indo- Singa- Hong New 
Origin Korea U S .  Canada Mexico Japan P.R. nesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Brunei pore Taiwan Kong Australia Zealand 
Korea 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Japan 
China P.R. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Brunei 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Australia 
New Zealand 
1.25 
0.23 
0.21 
1.78 
0.81 
1.75 
0.66 
1.15 
1.60 
0.40 
0.34 
0.49 
1.60 
0.75 
- 
1.23 
2.04 
2.00 
1.31 
0.49 
0.65 
0.46 
1.08 
0.73 
0.08 
0.85 
1.43 
1.09 
0.40 
0.64 
0.41 0.04 1.51 - 0.40 0.64 0.98 0.76 0.26 0.74 0.43 1.09 0.66 0.42 
3.59 3.76 1.63 0.75 0.72 1.05 1.47 0.89 0.70 0.93 1.36 0.45 1.46 1.12 
0.18 0.46 0.27 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.26 
0.35 0.51 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.01 - 0.02 0.07 0.06 
0.30 0.30 1.70 1.30 0.98 0.86 1.41 0.87 1.06 1.66 0.93 1.28 1.16 
0.14 0.13 1.66 0.85 0.76 0.71 0.93 0.57 1.81 - 8.24 0.49 0.21 
0.07 0.06 2.24 0.29 0.25 2.47 2.65 3.42 8.39 0.85 0.40 0.72 0.30 
0.14 0.01 1.93 0.61 0.38 1.81 1.36 0.32 1.26 0.86 0.92 0.62 0.45 
0.15 0.01 1.68 0.99 0.76 4.78 0.73 3.86 3.89 0.75 1.26 0.97 0.42 
- - 4.99 0.00 0.03 0.04 1.04 8.41 2.32 0.51 0.01 0.23 - 
0.09 0.04 0.79 0.85 4.56 8.11 1.39 3.96 14.28 1.20 2.04 1.30 1.47 
0.30 - 0.99 - 0.75 0.68 1.23 0.85 0.51 0.94 1.75 0.93 0.54 
0.31 0.04 0.38 5.69 0.29 0.74 1.88 0.61 0.49 0.94 1.54 0.88 0.00 
0.18 0.12 3.02 1.72 1.55 1.82 1.41 0.85 1.14 0.84 1.41 0.60 8.09 
0.26 0.37 1.74 1.11 1.12 1.41 1.53 0.70 0.51 0.74 0.61 0.47 8.36 
0.05 0.07 4.04 0.51 0.73 1.53 0.41 0.37 - 0.77 0.29 0.52 1.19 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C., 1993). 
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view to comparing them with NAFTA and East Asian countries. According to 
its gravity coefficients, Korea’s trade in North America has been concentrated 
mostly in the United States. Korea has maintained much less intense relations 
with Canada and Mexico. The situation has not changed over the years. By 
contrast, Korea’s trade relationship with APEC members has intensified. In 
1986, Korea maintained intense trade relationships with only three regional 
partners (3 out of 15 countries): the United States, Japan, and Hong Kong (see 
table 9.3). That is, the gravity coefficient of Korea’s exports to its trading part- 
ners in the region is greater than 1 for these three countries. In 1992, the num- 
ber of countries increased to seven, adding Indonesia, China, Thailand, and 
Singapore (see table 9.4). 
Small changes in Korea’s trade pattern with NAFTA members can be attrib- 
uted to the absence of structural linkages with Canada and Mexico driven by 
intraindustry trade or intrasectoral comparative advantage based on differences 
in labor costs. Korea’s intensified trade linkages with China, Thailand, Indone- 
sia, and Singapore have been established at the “expense” of Korean trade 
linkages with the United States. This development implies that Korean trade 
relations with APEC members (particularly East Asian countries) have become 
more diversified than before. Yet, Korea’s extended trade relations with mem- 
ber countries in the region cannot be attributed to geography or policy-related 
(horizontal) ties with these countries.* Instead, it resulted from the changing 
pattern of comparative advantage and specialization, reflecting increasing ver- 
tical linkages between Korea and other NIEs.~ 
9.2.2 International Industry Linkages: Backward Linkages and Net 
Export Earnings 
Backward Effects 
The degree of trade interdependence can be measured further in terms of 
linkages between industrial sectors participating in international transactions 
and their domestic counterparts. The extent to which the Korean economy is 
integrated into the North American economy can be inferred from its standard 
input-output mat rice^.^ The input-output matrix contains information on a key 
aspect of economic integration: international linkages through imported inputs 
2. Peter Petri (1993) has suggested three different kinds of structural linkages: geographical 
linkages, vertical linkages, and horizontal linkages. 
3. Another version of gravity coefficient, calculated from the ratio of an exporter’s share in a 
given market to its share in all world trade, shows that Korea has maintained a very intense trading 
relationship with Asia Pacific countries and that its intensity increased during the 1980s. Korea 
has shown an increasingly strong regional bias: while Korea’s gravity coefficients were greater 
than 1 with 10 out of 15 countries in 1986, they were greater than 1 with 12 countries in 1990 (see 
tables 9.5 and 9.6). 
4. An international input-output system would delineate detailed information on the economic 
structures of several national economies and on relationships among these economies. Yet, for the 
present purpose, only Korea’s input-output matrices are considered. 
Table 9.4 Gravity Coefficients of APEC Countries in 1992 (import) 
Destination 
China Indo- Singa- Hong New 
Origin Korea U S .  Canada Mexico Japan P.R. nesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Brunei pore Taiwan Kong Australia Zealand 
Korea 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Japan 
China P.R. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Brunei 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Australia 
New Zealand 
~ ~~ 
1.02 0.35 
1.34 3.33 
0.26 2.66 
0.08 2.74 0.61 
1.54 1.25 0.40 
0.69 0.81 0.22 
1.61 0.53 0.13 
0.96 0.74 0.15 
0.56 1.54 0.27 
0.55 1.09 0.24 
2.62 0.04 0.00 
1.56 0.89 0.14 
0.41 1.28 0.37 
0.33 0.67 0.22 
1.77 0.36 0.20 
1.29 0.56 0.26 
0.40 
3.57 
0.12 
0.36 
0.04 
0.06 
0.09 
0.04 
0.11 
0.06 
0.16 
0.29 
0.05 
0.35 
- 
1.67 1.03 2.40 0.81 0.23 1.30 
1.50 0.69 0.68 0.84 1.09 0.69 
0.49 0.34 0.20 0.08 0.16 0.13 
0.23 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1.15 1.48 1.48 1.49 1.86 
I .23 0.29 0.33 0.22 0.45 
3.35 1.16 0.81 0.64 0.40 
1.40 0.48 0.93 1.37 1.72 
1.88 0.35 0.50 0.91 0.50 
1.99 0.39 0.82 1.54 0.73 
4.42 0.04 - 0.03 4.15 3.60 
0.58 0.64 2.76 5.48 1.23 2.83 
1.15 - 1.27 1.26 1.68 1.38 
0.33 8.95 1.01 0.67 2.43 0.40 
2.78 1.02 2.42 1.10 0.98 1.03 
1.76 0.79 1.14 1.26 1.33 0.71 
0.09 1.34 0.94 1.15 0.87 0.46 
1.27 0.79 1.25 0.37 1.44 1.17 
0.01 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.22 
- 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03 
0.48 1.15 1.88 0.93 1.24 0.95 
0.07 0.42 - 4.67 0.67 0.40 
0.43 1.37 1.06 0.33 1.36 0.38 
3.14 5.77 0.78 0.50 0.83 0.52 
0.10 0.63 0.67 0.51 0.54 0.29 
0.84 2.72 0.60 0.72 0.10 0.58 
11.30 0.84 1.34 1.00 0.86 
0.09 0.88 1.92 1.02 0.68 
0.52 1.44 1.94 0.52 0.43 
0.44 1.78 1.20 0.36 9.91 
0.45 0.47 0.71 0.35 10.59 
1.74 0.66 0.00 - - 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C., 1993). 
Table 9.5 Gravity Coefficients in 1986 (export + import) 
Destination 
China Indo- Singa- Hang New 
Origin Korea U.S. Canada Mexico Japan P.R. nesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Brunei pore Taiwan Kong Australia Zealand 
Korea 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Japan 
China P.R. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Brunei 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Hang Kong 
Australia 
New Zealand 
2.241 
2.125 
0.752 4.823 
0.333 4.864 
2.993 2.272 
- 0.782 
1.539 1.290 
2.495 1.045 
1.601 2.010 
1.636 1.079 
2.527 0.597 
1.093 1.331 
0.765 2.775 
1.998 1.314 
1.966 1.129 
1.015 1.117 
0.765 
4.905 
0.645 
0.687 
0.384 
0.252 
0.161 
0.230 
0.25 1 
0.146 
0.610 
0.361 
0.384 
0.461 
0.227 
4.501 
0.405 
0.802 
0.297 
0.092 
0.070 
0.050 
0.235 
0.042 
0.055 
0.141 
0.383 
7.257 
5.149 
1.799 
1.640 
5.940 
11.371 
5.660 
5.401 
5.354 
12.352 
3.966 
5.292 
3.528 
6.68 1 
4.744 
- 1.376 2.659 
0.681 1.186 1.206 
0.452 0.274 0.245 
0.145 0.050 0.040 
2.874 4.678 2.699 
1.056 1.016 
1.056 1.347 
0.760 0.766 
1.358 1.842 5.186 
1.387 1.409 7.392 
0.055 0.159 1.968 
2.309 8.418 15.682 
- 1.781 1.747 
13.068 1.092 1.370 
1.750 1.818 2.423 
1.107 2.045 1.444 
1.911 
2.071 
0.289 
0.061 
2.121 
1.254 
2.784 
4.614 
2.238 
1.88 1 
2.725 
2.574 
3.035 
1.861 
1.734 
1.749 
1.118 
0.333 
0.165 
2.495 
1.692 
1.119 
6.293 
1.912 
14.572 
7.493 
1.641 
1.739 
1.439 
0.859 
3.844 1.301 
0.534 1.306 
- 0.144 
- 0.049 
6.570 1.784 
- 2.361 
3.831 20.748 
2.046 3.111 
15.740 7.531 
12.762 
11.451 
1.165 2.001 
0.246 2.730 
1.051 1.925 
0.362 1.777 
0.337 - 
0.858 2.155 
2.862 1.375 
0.667 0.369 
- 0.050 
2.387 1.533 
- 14.413 
1.895 1.356 
1.586 1.033 
2.203 2.970 
1.696 2.177 
0.956 0.191 
2.310 3.337 
3.580 
3.978 
2.038 1.350 
1.115 0.925 
2.046 
1.136 
0.468 
0.133 
3.008 
1.707 
2.048 
1.989 
1.469 
1.446 
0.555 
1.933 
2.196 
1.375 
14.338 
0.944 
1.160 
0.525 
0.272 
2.181 
1.167 
2.341 
1.123 
1.590 
0.760 
1.849 
1.110 
0.490 
12.98 1 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Direcfion of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C., 1993). 
Table 9.6 Gravity Coefficients in 1992 (export + import) 
Destination 
China Indo- Singa- Hang New 
Origin Korea U.S. Canada Mexico Japan P.R. nesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Brunei pore Taiwan Kong Australia Zealand 
Korea 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Japan 
China P.R. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Brunei 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Hang Kong 
Australia 
New Zealand 
1.679 0.566 
5.297 
0.550 
5.444 
0.801 
2.691 
1.963 
0.739 
0.631 
1.579 3.000 1.693 
0.784 0.943 1.300 
0.441 0.341 0.219 
0.116 0.194 0.128 
1.984 3.793 2.570 
1.191 0.744 
1.552 1.824 
0.852 1.721 
0.594 1.133 2.437 
0.855 1.146 3.358 
0.147 - 3.094 
1.198 4.759 11.967 
- 2.080 2.079 
14.184 1.121 1.251 
1.240 3.217 1.932 
0.871 1.206 2.392 
0.351 
2.312 
0.504 
0.072 
3.303 
0.576 
1.243 
2.989 
1.663 
1.243 
0.335 
0.154 
3.156 
0.754 
1.010 
3.232 
1.033 
3.301 2.158 
0.852 1.263 
0.012 0.182 
- 0.089 
3.978 1.785 
0.118 0.917 
0.499 - 
3.474 12.370 
5.475 2.129 
5.325 5.033 
1.188 
1.954 
0.515 
0.274 
2.545 
2. I85 
2.159 
2.386 
1.978 
0.818 
2.075 
1.630 
4.023 
1.923 
1.215 
- 
1.65 1 
1.137 
0.306 
0.201 
1.499 
11.478 
0.841 
0.994 
1.754 
1.157 
0.230 
2.763 
3.036 
2.362 
1.175 
0.466 
0.113 
2.855 
1.257 
3.352 
1.783 
1.690 
1.080 
1 S40 
1.209 
0.448 
0.458 
1.995 
0.807 
1.256 
1.624 
1.591 
1.091 
1.758 
0.586 
0.494 
2.61 1 
1.402 
3.485 
1.798 
1.774 
1.515 
3.363 
2.542 
1.092 
1.763 
2.394 
1.533 
5.503 
5.481 
1.933 
1.198 
0.964 
1.255 
2.021 
1.298 
0.793 
1.305 
1.956 
0.794 
1.152 
1.053 
0.776 
0.756 
0.508 
0.340 
0.253 
0.420 
0.313 
0.013 
0.640 
0.089 
0.193 
0.138 
0.060 
0.165 
1.735 
4.006 
2.487 
2.785 
3.108 
4.341 
1.729 
2.549 
1.637 
3.038 
1.963 
1.323 
7.204 
2.032 
2.824 
2.883 
1.722 
1.992 
5.482 
4.879 
1.869 
I .  123 
1.757 
0.897 
0.092 
0.285 
0.274 
0.116 
0.460 
11.335 1.676 
0.808 
0.326 2.626 
1.232 2.849 
- 1.125 
1.174 
1.947 
1.131 
0.183 
1.239 
0.747 
17.620 
0.390 
0.518 
0.257 
0.403 1.028 
0.758 19.718 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C., 1993). 
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and exported outputs. The information contained in the input-output matrix 
reveals the structure of “international production chains.” In particular, the 
input-output matrix can be used to infer “international backward linkages,” 
measures of which are very useful tools in assessing a relationship between 
trade and the domestic economy. International backward linkage measures in- 
dicate the direct and indirect import requirements of a particular demand sector 
(see Petri 1993 for details). 
ZM = M(Z - A,)-’F,  
where IM denotes the vector of imports due to a change in F (a final demand 
vector), A, is the domestic input coefficient matrix, and M is the import coeffi- 
cient matrix. This measure indicates the amount of imports required to produce 
a unit of output in a particular industry, and hence the degree of dependence 
on foreign resources (see tables 9.7-9.10 for the following analysis). 
Korea’s imports from NAFTA (APEC) countries induced by the increase in 
its exports to these countries amounted to $5.6 billion ($11.2 billion) in 1990, 
while they were $3.14 billion ($4.97 billion) in 1985 (see table 9.9). In five 
years, Korea’s induced imports from NAFTA countries less than doubled, 
while its induced imports from APEC members more than doubled. The 
United States accounted for 56 percent of Korea’s total induced imports in 
1985 and 44 percent in 1990. Canada accounted for 6.8 percent in 1985 and 
4.0 percent in 1990. The combined share of these two countries declined from 
almost 63 percent to 48 percent. Mexico’s share rose to 1.3 percent in 1990. 
This change implies that Korea’s backward linkages with these countries have 
lessened a lot during the 1985-90 period. On the other hand, induced imports 
from Japan increased more than three times, while those from the United States 
less than doubled. These developments indicate that it will take time for Korea 
to expand the basis of its integration into North America (and into the APEC 
area as a whole) and that Korea’s dependence on Japanese inputs has indeed 
deepened despite Korea’s deliberate efforts to reduce its trade dependence on 
Japan. 
When it comes to sectoral linkages, induced imports from North America 
are largest in the metal products and machinery sector (see table 9.9). The 
chemicals and chemical products, primary metal products, and textiles and 
leather sectors follow the metal products and machinery sector in order of im- 
portance. Yet, the rate of increase between 1985 and 1990 was fastest in the 
food, beverages, and tobacco products sector. This sector is followed by the 
paper, printing, and publishing and lumber and wood products sectors in order 
of magnitude. 
Net Export Earnings 
Given the structure of export supply, net export earnings reflect another as- 
pect of international linkages. Net export earnings are export revenues net of 
imported inputs used for the production of exportables. Thus, sectoral contri- 
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Table 9.7 Korean Exports to APEC Countries (million US. dollars) 
Industry 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 Total 
Year = 1990 
Australia 13.6 257.3 1.6 23.5 109.4 10.8 64.5 401.1 63.6 945.4 
Brunei 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.5 
Canada 19.0 648.4 2.6 7.0 106.3 11.2 37.3 806.4 86.6 1,724.8 
China 3.6 107.1 5.4 37.0 194.3 15.0 78.9 133.9 4.5 579.6 
Hong Kong 66.4 1,456.5 18.5 145.7 357.5 20.9 195.3 1,221.3 177.6 3,659.6 
Indonesia 28.0 328.5 0.4 13.0 149.2 6.9 117.8 401.4 15.9 1,061.2 
Japan 331.2 3,665.8 175.9 35.6 1,166.6 352.3 1,546.2 3,259.4 426.7 10,959.8 
Malaysia 2.4 49.7 0.4 5.2 47.8 4.5 103.9 472.8 11.8 698.6 
New Zealand 1.2 38.0 0.3 4.9 15.6 1.9 14.4 39.9 9.7 125.9 
Philippines 1.8 100.9 2.3 5.8 89.2 3.3 62.1 224.0 4.3 493.7 
Singapore 11.0 226.6 2.6 6.2 125.0 8.6 137.7 1,181.5 36.9 1,736.1 
Taiwan 21.8 176.8 19.8 5.9 197.8 17.0 182.8 511.6 31.0 1,164.5 
Thailand 3.3 216.5 0.7 9.5 185.0 4.8 153.0 337.5 18.9 929.2 
United States 108.1 6,837.6 64.1 106.8 703.7 113.7 700.0 9,187.7 1,350.7 19,172.4 
Mexico 17.4 139.5 0.8 1.1 15.7 0.7 16.1 344.9 21.8 558.1 
APEC 628.9 14,249.4 295.5 407.1 3,463.3 571.7 3,410.1 18,524.5 2,259.9 43,810.4 
Year = 1985 
Australia 
Brunei 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
United States 
Mexico 
APEC 
7.2 
0.0 
11.3 
0.0 
20.8 
0.2 
157.2 
0.6 
0.3 
0.0 
2.1 
2.6 
0.7 
62.0 
0.0 
264.9 
125.5 
0.0 
392.3 
0.0 
408.5 
20.1 
1,095.7 
18.2 
19.2 
21.3 
11 6.2 
27.8 
18.6 
4.1 15.0 
12.2 
6,390.6 
0.9 2.8 46.4 3.7 35.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.5 
0.6 1.6 38.0 8.5 35.7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5.6 24.6 148.7 23.3 121.9 
0.2 0.5 68.9 2.5 42.5 
45.9 9.2 841.3 93.0 468.8 
0.3 2.8 17.0 5.0 27.6 
0.0 0.1 3.9 0.2 3.3 
0.1 0.7 96.3 1.6 33.6 
2.9 4.1 37.3 13.7 22.0 
0.2 1.0 56.1 0.6 38.6 
0.0 1.0 60.5 0.8 23.7 
42.1 47.1 460.3 98.6 602.2 
0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 3.4 
98.9 95.9 1,875.4 253.2 1,461.3 
115.2 29.1 366.3 
0.5 0.0 4.8 
688.3 49.3 1,225.6 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
745.2 47.6 1,546.1 
53.8 0.8 189.6 
946.1 109.4 3,766.5 
370.2 2.6 444.3 
7.1 2.1 36.3 
82.4 0.2 236.2 
276.9 5.2 480.3 
38.1 4.4 169.5 
29.4 2.5 137.3 
4,445.0 762.6 10,635.0 
8.5 1.3 26.1 
7,806.6 1,017.2 19,264.0 
Data Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables (Seoul, 1985, 1990); Korean Customs Administra- 
tion, Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade (Seoul, 1985, 1990). 
Note: Industries-1, food, beverages, and tobacco products; 2, textiles and leather; 3, lumber and wood 
products; 4, paper, printing, and publishing; 5, chemicals and chemical products; 6, nonmetallic mineral 
products; 7, primary metal products; 8, metal products and machinery; 9, miscellaneous manufactured 
products. 
butions to net export earnings reveal the extent of sectoral import dependence. 
The export earnings ratio calculates the sectoral ratio of net export earnings to 
exports. For instance, a high export earnings ratio indicates low import depen- 
dence. Such sectoral net export earnings are obtained from the following 
formula: 
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Table 9.8 Korean Imports from APEC Countries (million U.S. dollars) 
Industry 
Country 1 2 3 4  5 6 7  8 9 Total 
Year = 1990 
Australia 324.9 35.2 0.5 10.6 86.9 2.6 508.3 62.5 4.1 1,035.5 
Brunei 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Canada 23.6 21.7 18.8 168.8 269.8 3.6 175.6 122.8 3.5 808.2 
China 159.9 572.3 8.5 0.4 328.7 201.9 236.2 42.8 36.4 1,587.2 
Hong Kong 1.3 60.5 2.1 11.6 27.2 6.0 25.2 432.6 14.1 580.5 
Indonesia 23.4 32.8 292.5 28.3 112.0 12.2 36.8 9.7 9.3 557.0 
Japan 52.6 743.3 60.7 171.5 3,482.6 257.2 1,806.9 11,048.3 207.0 17,830.2 
Malaysia 73.7 8.7 128.3 0.3 76.5 4.3 58.1 164.3 0.9 515.0 
New Zealand 36.2 8.8 6.9 39.2 68.4 0.0 53.2 1.8 0.0 214.7 
Philippines 34.6 5.1 2.2 0.5 59.0 1.5 46.2 70.5 3.8 223.3 
Singapore 11.1 2.1 4.0 9.4 354.6 5.5 42.5 448.6 2.2 880.2 
Taiwan 14.0 313.5 3.6 45.6 166.5 28.3 193.1 537.6 52.9 1,355.1 
Thailand 191.8 12.2 3.4 1.7 15.8 8.3 3.8 87.5 1.6 326.1 
United States 364.2 267.3 116.9 787.7 2,783.1 96.5 1,202.5 7,326.3 155.1 13,099.5 
Mexico 1.1 3.2 0.5 1.4 112.7 2.2 31.8 6.9 0.1 160.0 
APEC 1,312.4 2,086.7 649.0 1,277.0 7,943.6 630.2 4,420.1 20,362.3 491.0 39,172.4 
Year = 1985 
Australia 90.3 11.4 0.2 3.0 30.0 0.3 119.4 13.7 0.3 268.5 
Brunei 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Canada 6.9 7.7 2.5 48.3 142.2 5.6 33.6 41.7 0.2 288.7 
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hong Kong 1.1 37.2 0.6 2.5 5.1 0.6 4.1 411.0 6.4 468.6 
Indonesia 23.2 6.6 17.3 2.9 18.1 0.0 10.0 1.2 0.0 79.4 
Japan 41.3 492.4 8.4 71.4 1,323.3 181.0 962.1 4,210.9 82.0 7,372.7 
Malaysia 43.3 3.8 25.7 0.1 8.2 0.0 8.9 215.8 0.2 306.1 
New Zealand 29.9 6.8 0.4 7.3 7.3 0.0 24.9 0.3 0.0 76.9 
Philippines 25.3 0.7 1.1 0.0 9.0 0.1 18.5 67.9 0.1 122.7 
Singapore 13.1 0.8 4.0 4.0 85.5 0.7 1.8 137.8 0.1 247.8 
Taiwan 11.7 66.4 0.6 12.6 50.7 4.6 40.7 88.9 3.1 279.2 
Thailand 22.5 4.5 5.1 0.8 2.1 0.0 4.3 30.0 0.0 69.4 
United States 72.3 109.0 25.6 257.6 1,002.3 50.3 303.4 2,661.7 32.3 4,514.6 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 62.9 0.0 2.6 7.4 0.0 73.2 
APEC 380.9 747.2 91.4 410.6 2,747.0 243.3 1,534.1 7,888.4 124.9 14,167.9 
Data Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables (Seoul, 1985,1990); Korean Customs Administration, 
Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade (Seoul, 1985, 1995). 
Note: See table 9.7 note for key to industries. 
NX = E - M ( I  - A,) - 'E,  
where A, is the domestic input coefficient matrix, E denotes Korea's exports 
(to the Asia Pacific region), and M indicates the import coefficient matrix. 
Net export earnings ratios in North American markets were around 82-98 
percent in 1990 (80-96 percent in 1985) in the textiles and leather, metal prod- 
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Table 9.9 Backward Effects of Korea’s External Linkages with APEC Countries 
(million U.S. dollars) 
Industry 
Country 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Australia 15.2 
Brunei 0.0 
Canada 35.9 
China 6.9 
Hong Kong 81.3 
Indonesia 19.1 
Japan 212.6 
New Zealand 2.2 
Philippines 6.0 
Singapore 14.6 
Taiwan 11.9 
Thailand 12.8 
United States 378.0 
Mexico 8.4 
APEC 808.7 
Malaysia 3.7 
Australia 
Brunei 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
United States 
Mexico 
5.2 
0.0 
15.3 
0.0 
16.8 
1.1 
48.4 
1.2 
0.7 
1.3 
4.7 
1.4 
1 .o 
58.9 
0.5 
APEC 256.5 
31.7 
0.0 
76.9 
13.2 
172.5 
38.6 
434.9 
6.7 
4.7 
12.1 
28.4 
22.2 
26.0 
822.1 
16.8 
1,706.7 
15.6 
0.0 
45.9 
0.0 
48.7 
2.9 
131.7 
2.8 
2.2 
3.2 
13.5 
3.7 
2.7 
49 1.7 
1.4 
765.9 
Year = 1990 
1.6 7.8 61.4 3.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.6 9.0 104.3 4.9 
0.9 8.0 54.3 2.0 
6.4 39.1 246.7 9.7 
0.9 6.4 72.8 3.2 
29.5 53.7 715.2 38.7 
0.8 3.2 32.9 2.8 
0.2 1.3 8.5 0.4 
0.6 2.8 34.6 1.7 
2.2 7.5 87.5 6.4 
3.2 5.5 77.4 4.3 
0.9 5.2 68.9 3.1 
37.0 105.2 1,081.0 56.7 
0.8 2.5 27.5 1.7 
87.6 257.4 2,673.1 138.5 
Year = 1985 
0.4 2.0 23.4 1.6 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
1.3 5.5 62.2 6.6 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.7 9.8 87.0 8.2 
0.1 0.8 15.2 1.0 
4.4 16.7 269.8 15.4 
0.5 2.1 17.6 3.4 
0.0 0.2 2.5 0.1 
0.1 1.0 19.8 1.1 
0.5 2.5 25.3 2.8 
0.1 0.8 13.4 0.8 
0.0 0.7 12.4 0.6 
13.3 53.6 593.9 49.8 
0.0 0.1 1.5 0.1 
22.6 95.9 1,144.3 91.5 
44.3 
0.0 
66.0 
28.8 
137.1 
55.7 
602.6 
55.3 
6.4 
29.8 
110.6 
78.1 
59.5 
821.2 
27.2 
2,122.5 
17.3 
0.6 
62.2 
0.0 
85.2 
13.3 
178.7 
34.4 
1.3 
13.7 
26.4 
11.3 
7.5 
492.2 
1.4 
945.5 
73.8 
0.2 
144.8 
28.2 
232.6 
75.2 
648.3 
82.0 
7.8 
40.8 
203.6 
94.5 
64.3 
1,650.6 
59.8 
3,406.4 
24.8 
0.2 
134.6 
0.0 
148.8 
11.8 
209.7 
70.2 
1.7 
17.1 
53.9 
8.8 
6.8 
908.3 
1.8 
1,598.4 
1 .o 
0.0 
2.0 
0.3 
4.3 
0.9 
10.9 
0.4 
0.1 
0.3 
1.1 
0.8 
0.7 
23.8 
0.5 
47.1 
1 .O 
0.0 
2.9 
0.0 
3.0 
0.2 
7.9 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.8 
0.2 
0.2 
31.0 
0.0 
47.9 
239.9 
0.4 
446.3 
142.7 
929.7 
272.7 
2,746.3 
187.8 
31.8 
128.8 
461.9 
297.7 
241.4 
4,975.7 
145.3 
11,248.1 
91.1 
1.1 
336.5 
0.0 
409.3 
46.2 
882.7 
132.5 
8.9 
57.6 
130.5 
40.6 
31.8 
2,792.8 
6.9 
4,968.5 
Data Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables (Seoul, 1985, 1990); Korean Customs Administration, 
Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade (Seoul, 1985, 1990). 
Note: See table 9.7 note for key to industries. 
ucts and machinery, and miscellaneous manufactured products sectors (see ta- 
ble 9. lo). The high export earnings ratio implies that import dependence is 
quite low in these sectors. By contrast, import dependence is high in such sec- 
tors as food, beverages, and tobacco products; paper, printing, and publishing; 
chemicals and chemical products; and primary metal products. Their indexes 
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Table 9.10 Net Export Earnings of Korean Exports to APEC Countries 
(million US. dollars) 
Industry 
Country 1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9 Total 
Australia 
Brunei 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
United States 
Mexico 
APEC 
Australia 
Brunei 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
United States 
Mexico 
APEC 
-1.6 
0.1 
- 16.9 
-3.3 
- 14.9 
8.8 
11 8.6 
-1.3 
- 1.0 
-4.3 
-3.7 
9.9 
-9.4 
-269.9 
9.0 
- 179.8 
2.0 
0.0 
-4.1 
0.0 
4.0 
-1.0 
108.7 
-0.6 
-0.4 
- 1.3 
-2.6 
1.1 
-0.4 
-96.9 
-0.4 
8.5 
225.6 
0.1 
57 1.5 
93.9 
1,284.1 
289.9 
3,230.9 
43.0 
33.3 
88.8 
198.2 
154.6 
190.5 
6,015.5 
122.7 
12,542.7 
0.0 
-0.0 
0.0 
4.5 
12.1 
-0.5 
146.5 
-0.3 
0.0 
1.7 
0.3 
16.6 
-0.2 
27.0 
-0.0 
207.9 
110.0 0.5 
0.0 0.0 
346.3 -0.6 
0.0 0.0 
359.7 3.9 
17.3 0.0 
964.0 41.5 
15.4 -0.2 
17.0 0.0 
18.1 -0.0 
102.7 2.4 
24.1 0.0 
15.9 -0.0 
3,623.3 28.8 
10.8 -0.0 
5,624.7 76.3 
Year = 1990 
15.7 48.0 7.7 
-0.0 0.0 0.0 
-2.1 2.0 6.4 
29.0 140.0 13.0 
106.5 110.9 11.2 
6.6 76.5 3.7 
-18.1 451.4 313.6 
2.0 14.9 1.7 
3.6 7.0 1.5 
2.9 54.7 1.7 
-1.3 37.5 2.2 
0.4 120.4 12.7 
4.3 116.0 1.8 
1.6 -377.3 57.0 
-1.4 -11.8 -1.0 
149.8 790.2 433.1 
20.2 
-0.0 
-28.7 
50.1 
58.1 
62.2 
943.6 
48.6 
8.0 
32.3 
27.1 
104.8 
93.5 
- 121.2 
-11.1 
1,287.5 
327.3 
0.9 
661.7 
105.6 
988.7 
326.3 
2,611.2 
390.8 
32.0 
183.2 
978.0 
417.1 
273.1 
7,537.1 
285.1 
1x11 8.1 
62.6 705.6 
-0.0 1.1 
84.6 1,278.5 
4.2 436.9 
173.3 2,730.0 
15.0 788.4 
415.8 8,213.5 
11.4 510.8 
9.6 94.2 
4.0 365.0 
35.8 1,274.2 
30.2 866.8 
18.2 687.8 
1,326.9 14,196.7 
21.3 412.8 
2,212.8 32,562.3 
Year = 1985 
0.8 23.0 2.1 
0.0 -0.1 1.5 
-3.9 -24.2 1.9 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
14.8 61.6 15.1 
-0.2 53.8 1.6 
-7.5 571.5 77.6 
0.7 -0.6 1.6 
-0.0 1.4 0.1 
-0.2 76.4 0.4 
1.6 11.9 10.9 
0.4 48.2 0.3 
0.2 42.7 -0.1 
-6.6 -133.6 48.9 
-0.0 -0.9 -0.0 
-0.0 731.1 161.7 
18.3 
1.9 
-26.5 
0.0 
36.7 
29.2 
290.1 
-6.8 
2.0 
19.9 
-4.4 
27.2 
16.2 
110.0 
2.0 
515.8 
90.4 
0.3 
553.7 
0.0 
596.4 
42.0 
736.4 
300.0 
5.4 
65.3 
222.9 
29.3 
22.7 
3,536.7 
6.7 
6,208.2 
28.1 275.2 
0.0 3.8 
46.5 889.1 
0.0 0.0 
44.6 1,136.8 
0.6 143.4 
101.4 2,883.8 
2.4 311.8 
2.0 27.4 
0.0 178.6 
4.4 349.8 
4.2 128.9 
2.4 105.5 
731.6 7,842.2 
1.2 19.2 
969.3 14,295.5 
Data Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables (Seoul, 1985, 1990); Korean Customs Administration, 
Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade (Seoul, 1985, 1990). 
Nore; See table 9.7 note for key to industries. 
were negative in both years (except for paper, printing, and publishing in 1990 
and primary metal products in 1985). 
Several sectors have experienced a substantial increase in earnings ratio: 
nonmetallic mineral products, metal products and machinery, and miscellane- 
ous manufactured products. This increase in earnings ratio implies that the 
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extent of these sectors’ import dependence has declined. On the other hand, 
export earnings indexes went down in the primary metal products and chemi- 
cals and chemical products sectors, reflecting an increase in dependence on 
these imported inputs. 
Yet, Korea’s overall dependence on imports from North America increased 
slightly during that period (from 73.6 percent in 1985 to 74.1 percent in 1990). 
It was not much different from Korea’s overall dependence on imports from 
Asia Pacific, which was 74.2 percent in 1985 and 74.3 percent in 1990. These 
results again show that Korea’s dependence on imports from APEC countries 
has not changed much and that there is room for Korea to deepen interindustry 
linkages with its neighbors in the region. 
9.2.3 Foreign Direct Investment 
The pattern of foreign direct investment reveals the extent to which the Ko- 
rean economy is integrated into the North American economy. The majority of 
foreign direct investment in Korea has come from the United States, which 
accounted for more than 29 percent of the total investment stock ($11.2 billion) 
as of the end of 1993.5 The U.S. share of investment inflows into Korea grew 
over the past three decades: 37 percent (1960s), 55 percent (1970s), and 48 
percent (1980s). After 1989, however, U.S. investment flows declined rapidly 
until 1992. Since then, they have resumed their growth. Canada’s investment 
share is less than 1 percent of total inward direct investment to Korea (see 
tables 9.11 and 9.12). 
Similarly, Korea’s outward investment is destined for only a few countries: 
the United States, Indonesia, China, and Canada.6 The combined stock of Ko- 
rea’s investment in the United States ($1.7 billion, or 31 percent of its total 
outward investment outstanding) and Canada ($409 million, or 7 percent) ac- 
counted for around 38 percent as of the end of 1993.’ (It was 47 percent in 
1990.) By contrast, Korea’s investment in APEC countries constituted 79 per- 
cent of its total outward investment stock in 1990. APEC’s share, however, 
declined slightly to 75 percent in 1993. 
Almost half of Korea’s overseas investment went to the manufacturing sector 
($2.7 billion), of which around 80 percent ($2.2 billion) went to APEC coun- 
tries and 34 percent ($930 million) to NAFTA countries. A closer look at man- 
ufacturing subindustries reveals more information. Korea’s overseas invest- 
ment went to selected industries in a limited number of countries. For instance, 
5. The US. share remained at almost the same level in 1994 (28.5 percent of a total of $12.5 
billion). 
6. Although it tends to decline over time, the combined share of the top four host countries was 
around 68-74 percent in the late 1980s. Those countries are the United States, Indonesia, North 
Yemen, and Canada, in order of magnitude. Their combined share was 74 percent as of 1987,73 
percent as of 1988, and 68 percent as of 1989. 
7. Indonesia and China accounted for $796 million (14 percent of the total) and $475 million 
(8.5 percent of the total), respectively. Yet, these numbers do not properly reflect the importance 
of China as a Korean investment destination. While investment in China was a new phenomenon, 
it increased eightfold over the three-year period (199 1-93). 
Table 9.11 Korea’s Investment Relationship with APEC Countries 
(thousand U.S. dollars) 
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Japan 
China 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Brunei 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Australia 
New Zealand 
APEC 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
71,379 50,328 
58,477 167,705 
129,856 218,033 
112 360 
20,728 9,467 
20,840 9,827 
0 0 
0 0 
246,021 268,604 
1,968 1,279 
247,989 269,883 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1,519 125,048 
1,519 125,048 
0 0 
116 794 
116 794 
0 0 
101 440 
101 440 
45 180 
45 180 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
0 0 
113 6,400 
0 324 
113 6,724 
0 115 
0 0 
0 115 
876 36,257 
3,354 2,571 
4,230 38,828 
2,288 50 
696 3,416 
2,984 3,466 
18 18 
0 13 
18 31 
320,789 362,114 
87,004 311,237 
163,801 172,591 
92,896 168,520 
256,697 341,111 
1,157 808 
3,386 114,399 
4,543 115,207 
0 347 
0 347 
297,606 307,477 
6,503 10,179 
304,109 317,656 
0 0 
0 6,360 
0 6,360 
18,998 75,390 
18,998 75,390 
103 0 
1,294 3,081 
1,397 3,081 
153 0 
500 2,645 
653 2,645 
8,052 9,141 
8,052 9,141 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
0 0 
2,089 602 
198 158 
2,287 760 
108 960 
0 185 
108 1,145 
14,906 11,327 
3,937 12,989 
18,843 24,316 
0 447 
624 4,655 
624 5,102 
18 18 
0 100 
18 118 
479,923 496,302 
136,388 408,149 
224,452 
342,627 
567,079 
7,134 
92,335 
99,469 
0 
0 
295,372 
10,925 
306,297 
0 
15,974 
15,974 
163,979 
163,979 
181 
17,529 
17,710 
0 
32,147 
32,147 
12,807 
12,807 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0 
12,536 
2,777 
15,313 
66 1 
2,007 
2,668 
16,260 
4,568 
20,828 
0 
14,829 
14,829 
18 
0 
18 
561,112 
712,504 
213,488 245,242 
395,244 346,872 
608,732 592.1 14 
953 2,990 
68,066 44,770 
69,019 47,760 
10,835 324 
10,835 324 
173,310 165,355 
14,934 63,617 
188,244 228,972 
0 0 
42,468 141,161 
42,468 141,161 
170,075 164,408 
170,075 164,408 
0 0 
69,555 23,661 
69,555 23,661 
280 0 
48.269 20,508 
48,549 20,508 
32,489 26,357 
32,489 26,357 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
0 0 
2,542 2,291 
5,526 13,426 
8,068 15,717 
287 0 
3,972 5,163 
4,259 5,163 
6,095 8,371 
13,193 44,460 
19,288 52,831 
0 0 
8,758 16,385 
8,758 16,385 
18 18 
44 3,797 
62 3,815 
396,955 425,529 
883,428 914,909 
Sum 407,793 673,351 616,311 904,451 1,273,616 1,280,383 1,340,438 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Trends in Foreign Investment (Seoul, July 1994); Bank of Korea, Over- 
seas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (Seoul, 1993). 
Note: Inward (arrival basis); outward (arrival basis). 
Table 9.12 Korea’s Investment Relationship with APEC Countries 
(share in percent) 
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
Japan 
China 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Brunei 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Australia 
New Zealand 
APEC 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
Inward 
Outward 
Sum 
22.25 
67.21 
31.84 
0.03 
23.82 
5.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
76.69 
2.26 
60.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.75 
0.37 
0.00 
0.13 
0.03 
0.00 
0.12 
0.02 
0.00 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.27 
3.85 
1.04 
0.71 
0.80 
0.73 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
13.90 
53.88 
32.38 
0.10 
3.04 
1.46 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
74.18 
0.41 
40.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
40.18 
18.57 
0.00 
0.26 
0.12 
0.00 
0.14 
0.07 
0.00 
0.06 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
I .77 
0.10 
1.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
10.01 
0.83 
5.77 
0.01 
1.10 
0.51 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
34.13 
68.11 
41.65 
0.24 
0.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
62.01 
4.77 
49.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
13.93 
3.08 
0.02 
0.95 
0.23 
0.03 
0.37 
0.11 
0.00 
5.90 
1.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.44 
0.15 
0.37 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
3.11 
2.89 
3.06 
0.00 
0.46 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
2.48 
34.78 
41.29 
37.71 
0.16 
28.03 
12.74 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
6 1.95 
2.49 
35.12 
0.00 
1.56 
0.70 
0.00 
18.47 
8.34 
0.00 
0.75 
0.34 
0.00 
0.65 
0.29 
0.00 
2.24 
1.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
0.19 
0.05 
0.13 
2.28 
3.18 
2.69 
0.09 
1.14 
0.56 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
40.00 
48.09 
44.53 
1.27 
12.96 
7.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
52.64 
1.53 
24.05 
0.00 
2.24 
1.25 
0.00 
23.01 
12.88 
0.03 
2.46 
1.39 
0.00 
4.5 I 
2.52 
0.00 
1.80 
1.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.23 
0.39 
1.20 
0.12 
0.28 
0.21 
2.90 
0.64 
1.64 
0.00 
2.08 
1.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
53.78 
44.74 
47.54 
0.24 
7.70 
5.39 
0.00 
1.23 
0.85 
43.66 
1.69 
14.70 
0.00 
4.81 
3.32 
0.00 
19.25 
13.28 
0.00 
7.87 
5.43 
0.07 
5.46 
3.79 
0.00 
3.68 
2.54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.64 
0.63 
0.63 
0.07 
0.45 
0.33 
1.54 
1.49 
1.51 
0.00 
0.99 
0.68 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
l00.00 
lOO.00 
100.00 
57.63 
37.91 
44.17 
0.70 
4.89 
3.56 
0.00 
0.04 
0.02 
38.86 
6.95 
17.08 
0.00 
15.43 
10.53 
0.00 
17.97 
12.27 
0.00 
2.59 
I .77 
0.00 
2.24 
1.53 
0.00 
2.88 
I .97 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.54 
1.47 
1.17 
0.00 
0.56 
0.39 
1.97 
4.86 
3.94 
0.00 
1.79 
1.22 
0.00 
0.42 
0.28 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Trends in Foreign Investment (Seoul, July 1994); Bank of Korea, Over- 
seas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (Seoul, 1993). 
Note: Inward (arrival basis); outward (arrival basis). 
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Table 9.13 U.S. Market Share 
Country 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 
Canada 19.3 18.9 16.7 18.0 18.2 19.1 
Mexico 6.4 5.4 4.9 5.6 6.3 6.9 
United Kingdom 4.8 4.3 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.7 
France 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 
Germany 4.9 5.9 6.6 5.2 5.3 5.1 
Italy 2.2 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.4 - 
Japan 16.2 20.2 20.9 19.8 18.7 18.5 
China 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.6 4.0 5.4 
Korea 2.9 3.0 4.3 4.2 3.5 2.9 
Taiwan 4.5 5.0 6.3 5.2 4.8 4.3 
Hong Kong 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.6 
Singapore 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.2 
Source: OECD Trade Tapes (database; Paris, various issues). 
investment in textiles and apparel is mostly concentrated in China and Indone- 
sia; food and beverages and petroleum in Indonesia; leather products and foot- 
wear in China; and nonmetals in the United States. But, investment in fabri- 
cated metals has been locationally diversified, going to the United States, 
China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.* 
9.3 An Assessment of the Effects of NAFTA 
9.3.1 The Potential Extent of Trade Diversion: Evidence 
It is of interest to assess the extent of trade diversion attributable to NAFTA. 
From the Korean perspective, trade diversion is likely to arise because of pref- 
erential treatment granted to Mexico in the U.S. market. While it is difficult to 
measure directly the scope of trade diversion away from Korea, some useful 
indicators can be employed to assess indirectly the diversion effect. 
Market Share 
Market share is a good indicator of competitiveness, as it reflects the relative 
strength of a trading nation in a given market. Korea’s share in the U.S. market 
increased to a peak of 4.6 percent in 1988 and declined continuously thereafter. 
In 1993, Korea’s market share was at the same level it had attained in 1983. 
The decrease in market share can be partly attributed to a slowdown in growth 
and delayed recovery of the U.S. economy, but it is more attributable to the 
emergence of China and the East Asian NIEs, which replaced Korea as major 
producers of “low value-added” products (see table 9.13). At the same time, 
market share changes in the United States can be indirectly attributed to trade 
diversion due to the accession of Mexico to CUSFTA. An increase in Mexico’s 
8. See Bank of Korea (1994) for detailed statistical information. 
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market share seems to have contributed to declines in the market shares of its 
competitors. As shown in table 9.13, almost every country except China and 
Canada suffered a loss in market share after 1989-90. Although it is difficult 
to sort out the trade diversion effect from this data, it is not unreasonable to 
suspect that the scope of trade diversion will be substantial if the current 
trend continues. 
Export Similarity Index 
The trade diversion effect is likely to depend on the degree to which the 
exports of Mexico and Korea to the U.S. market are similar to each other. The 
export similarity index quantifies the trade diversion effect by measuring 
the extent to which Mexico’s exports overlap Korea’s exports. In the following 
equation, one version of the export similarity index is employed to assess the 
intensity of competition in exports between various countries to the markets of 
the United States and Canada:9 
EX@c) + EX,(bC) 
SZ(U, b, C )  = C I EX,(ac) - I .  
2 
This formula measures the difference in the export patterns of countries a and 
b to market c. If the commodity distributions of the exports of a and b are 
identical, then the index will take on a value of zero. EXt(ac) is the share of 
commodity i in a’s exports to c. The data are from the OECD Series C import 
data available from 1981 to 1991. The data were disaggregated at the level of 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) two- to four-digit revision 
3 categories. All calculations were made over manufactured exports and total 
exports. Export similarity indexes are reported in table 9.14 for 1981, 1986, 
and 1991 (or 1990). 
Although the Korea-Mexico indexes became smaller throughout the years 
(from 0.87 in 1981 to 0.70 in 1990), they were still very large in comparison 
with that of any other pair in each year considered. This implies that Korean 
and Mexican exports to the combined U.S.-Canadian market were not similar 
and that the intensity of the competition between Korea and Mexico in the 
combined market was less significant than the competition between any other 
pair in every year considered. Korea competed in the US.-Canadian market 
less with Mexico than with Taiwan, Japan, APEC 11, and China. Taiwan was 
Korea’s fiercest competitor in the U.S.-Canadian market in 1981, while Japan 
and APEC 11 (excluding Japan and NAFTA countries) replaced Taiwan as Ko- 
rea’s major export competitors in 1990. Almost the same results were obtained 
for the U S .  market alone. 
Similarity indexes were also calculated for selected sectors: (1) food and live 
animals (SITC 0), (2) mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials (SITC 3), 
9. Finger and Kreinin (1979) developed an index of export similarity that measures the propor- 
tion of a country’s exports matched by a competitor’s exports in the same product category. 
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Table 9.14 
Year KR-MX KR-CN KR-JP KR-TW KR-APl1 KR-EC EC-AP12 
Similarity Indexes in the United States and Canada (total items) 
Combined U.S.-Canadian Market 
1981 0.87809 0.72818 0.49099 0.38417 0.57112 0.78384 0.65225 
1986 0.76635 0.63513 0.35603 0.38570 0.44582 0.66793 0.63382 
1990 0.69884 0.57381 0.38342 0.50819 0.47285 0.68935 0.67190 
U.S. Market Alone 
1981 0.87660 0.74097 0.49720 0.39183 0.57634 0.79196 0.65254 
1986 0.76258 0.64033 0.35760 0.38695 0.44526 0.68406 0.64828 
1991 0.70567 0.56148 0.39341 0.5281 1 0.47079 0.69015 0.68200 
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade by Commodities (Paris, various issues). 
Note: APll = AP12 - Korea. 
(3) textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products (SITC 
65), (4) iron and steel (SITC 67), and (5) road vehicles including air-cushion 
vehicles (SITC 78). According to the results, reported in table 9.15, the export 
patterns of Mexico and Korea were very different in the agricultural (SITC 0) 
and primary input (SITC 3) sectors. The two countries showed highly dissimi- 
lar trade patterns even in the textiles and apparel (SITC 65) sector. Only in 
the automobiles sector were Mexico-Korea similarity indexes lower. Again, 
Mexico was not one of Korea’s major competitors in North America except in 
the automobiles sector. 
These results seem to imply that possible trade diversion caused by NAFTA 
would be limited in scope. Preferential treatment granted to Mexico would not 
then drastically reduce Korea’s market share in the North American market.’O 
Specialization Structure 
Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indexes show the pattern of sectoral 
comparative advantage. They can be used to infer whether Korea’s trade with 
NAFTA members is consistent with the principles of comparative advantage 
and whether its trade relationship with them is complementary or supple- 
mentary. 
RCA indexes, which are supposed to identify the structural sources of spe- 
cialization, were initially constructed by Balassa (1965). The original Balassa 
index measures whether a particular product’s share of the exports of a certain 
10. Similarity indexes reported in table 9.14 imply that Korea and Taiwan compete with each 
other increasingly less fiercely in U.S. and Canadian markets. At the same time, the sectoral simi- 
larity indexes selectively reported in table 9.15 do not show any tendency toward more serious 
competition between the two countries in these markets. Despite apparent similarity between their 
economic conditions, Korea and Taiwan do not seem to run against each other as serious contend- 
ers, at least in U.S. and Canadian markets. In this regard, Taiwan is likely to experience different 
sectoral impact effects of NAFTA than Korea. However, this does not imply that these two coun- 
tries will face different levels of “total impact effects.” As one of the discussants indicated, Taiwan 
also experienced “the same lack of impact of NAFTA“ as Korea did. 
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Table 9.15 Similarity Indexes in the United States and Canada (five items) 
Year SITC" KR-MX KR-CN KR-JP KR-TW KR-APl1 KR-EC EC-AP12 
1981 0 
3 
65 
67 
78 
1986 0 
3 
65 
67 
78 
1990 0 
3 
65 
67 
78 
1981 0 
3 
65 
67 
78 
1986 0 
3 
65 
67 
78 
1991 0 
3 
65 
67 
78 
0.89045 
0.99950 
0.84049 
0.49494 
0.69646 
0.81027 
0.97304 
0.69050 
0.35671 
0.60891 
0.85772 
0.98999 
0.73438 
0.60730 
0.29447 
0.88592 
0.99946 
0.89104 
0.50177 
0.69295 
0.80245 
0.97234 
0.76680 
0.35733 
0.54706 
0.86817 
0.96423 
0.79404 
0.68364 
0.31573 
0.67159 
0.76446 
0.66491 
0.98461 
0.28711 
0.69330 
0.76166 
0.62070 
0.86047 
0.93284 
0.75642 
0.99177 
0.73438 
0.95962 
0.83333 
0.71962 
0.76446 
0.65037 
0.98549 
0.29841 
0.69464 
0.76166 
0.60143 
0.87252 
0.92284 
0.73150 
0.97637 
0.75346 
0.95802 
0.90805 
Combined U.S.-Canadian Market 
0.77003 0.47536 0.79533 0.71219 
0.93525 0.46813 0.93685 0.88714 
0.47575 0.61729 0.60200 0.53684 
0.10535 0.30907 0.41529 0.56143 
0.20898 0.29075 0.23430 0.76302 
0.58943 0.51171 0.61887 0.74578 
0.90009 0.99701 0.91095 0.74640 
0.40932 0.56801 0.53930 0.49605 
0.13989 0.41816 0.35364 0.35392 
0.33233 0.87432 0.87802 0.13948 
0.61579 0.56599 0.63778 0.73902 
0.98595 0.90192 0.98955 0.97622 
0.44983 0.59652 0.5981 1 0.57052 
0.24377 0.45847 0.52175 0.57183 
0.32060 0.79145 0.66486 0.14080 
U.S. Market Alone 
0.76690 0.51860 0.79277 0.71976 
0.93527 0.46813 0.93687 0.88342 
0.49787 0.65002 0.62010 0.60396 
0.09586 0.29390 0.39326 0.58715 
0.22784 0.30030 0.25915 0.76271 
0.58671 0.50584 0.61766 0.74768 
0.90009 0.99701 0.91095 0.70490 
0.41450 0.56974 0.53259 0.58305 
0.14422 0.41749 0.35839 0.33264 
0.37535 0.90566 0.90422 0.12755 
0.67102 0.55826 0.69381 0.74741 
0.80388 0.72524 0.82328 0.69847 
0.49259 0.63426 0.64159 0.60329 
0.26028 0.48377 0.60212 0.59978 
0.36482 0.88184 0.70947 0.21101 
0.69410 
0.09430 
0.54613 
0.56439 
0.75951 
0.64802 
0.18731 
0.50061 
0.36051 
0.24195 
0.7 1161 
0.38001 
0.54871 
0.48116 
0.263 19 
0.70265 
0.09803 
0.61905 
0.58020 
0.76365 
0.663 16 
0.2613 1 
0.55453 
0.35226 
0.29860 
0.71072 
0.47661 
0.60230 
0.5077 1 
0.26770 
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade by Commodities (Paris, various issues). 
Note: APll = AP12 - Korea. 
a 0: Food and live animals 
65: Textile yam, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products 
67: Iron and steel 
78: Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 
3: Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials 
economy is greater or less than the average of a given reference zone. This 
index is useful for understanding the trade pattern and the structure of compar- 
ative advantage. In the Balassa index the structural sources of specialization 
are revealed by actual trade data. On the other hand, a qualitatively same mea- 
sure can be obtained from import data, except for the fact that it should be read 
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in the opposite direction: the measures obtained indicate comparative disad- 
vantage. Thus, the Balassa index can be used to infer whether a certain product 
meets the conditions for comparative advantage or disadvantage. Yet, the index 
can be contradictory if it is obtained from a different data set: while the export 
measure of a certain product shows comparative advantage, the import mea- 
sure of the same product may show comparative disadvantage. 
In this case, a measure of comparative advantage based on the trade balance 
(the difference between the value of exports and imports) is more useful. This 
measure, the Lafay indicator, determines whether the item concerned has com- 
parative advantage or disadvantage by comparing its attributed trade balance 
with its actual trade balance in relation to GDP. The attributed trade balance is 
calculated with reference to an equilibrium trade balance by allocating to each 
product a fraction of the overall surplus or deficit. This attribution is made on 
a pro rata basis in relation to the economy’s total trade. The Lafay indicator 
thus calculated can then be used for ranking products according to their com- 
parative advantage status. Lafay’s point is that the comparative advantage for a 
given item will be enhanced when the production of that item in the country 
increases faster than domestic demand for it, other things being equal. In other 
words, the comparative advantage of the item concerned will improve when 
the difference between the export and import ratios or the self-sufficiency ratio 
increases.” Although it is not free from several methodological problems, the 
refined Lafay RCA index eliminates distortions inherent in the Balassa index 
by taking into consideration the evolution of intratrade flows, macroeconomic 
conditions, and a weighting scheme reflecting the characteristics of the product 
at the world leve1.I2 
This Lafay indicator, Jlk, is defined as follows: l 3  
where 
11. Obviously not satisfied with the export-import ratio as an indicator of specialization, Lafay 
suggested taking account of domestic economic structure, emphasizing the importance of internal 
economic conditions in the evolution of specialization. 
12. The data used here are compiled from the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook and 
the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics Yearbook. The aggregation level is mostly SITC three-digit 
with a few SITC two-digit or SITC four-digit classifications. 
13. World weights adjusted to a given base year would eliminate the impact of trade volume 
changes that are not specific to the economy in question. See Lafay (1992) for details. 
Table 9.16 Lafay Indexes of Korean Industries (million U.S. dollars) 
SITC" 
Year 51 52 651 652-655 672-675 75 763 764 776 781 784 793 761 762 775 84 85 
1981 -13.03 -2.42 7.17 24.22 8.01 -2.36 1.62 -3.09 1.05 1.85 -1.82 10.63 13.15 5.91 1.51 99.58 25.50 
1982 -13.07 -1.52 4.81 19.93 12.62 -3.64 1.28 -5.14 2.34 1.05 -1.58 20.73 10.24 5.29 1.49 82.46 23.17 
1983 -11.49 -1.27 4.90 18.19 7.37 -2.42 0.28 -2.40 0.44 1.49 -1.80 19.21 12.86 5.87 1.82 70.04 21.10 
1984 -12.47 -1.76 4.60 16.88 3.18 0.91 0.17 -2.07 1.51 2.54 -1.43 18.25 14.31 6.82 3.54 70.51 19.88 
1985 -12.96 -1.81 4.17 15.41 1.83 1.97 1.93 -0.02 0.62 6.61 -0.83 13.51 10.50 5.76 3.32 64.35 20.47 
1986 -14.22 -1.82 2.05 14.67 4.63 1.48 3.55 1.25 -2.75 11.75 -2.01 13.80 11.36 6.10 4.61 54.93 20.06 
1987 -15.05 -1.98 -0.27 13.90 2.06 4.91 5.33 3.41 -4.80 17.43 -2.74 5.42 12.59 7.57 5.26 53.11 20.44 
1988 -16.18 -2.01 0.78 12.11 3.10 4.76 6.75 1.98 -1.89 17.35 -2.27 9.16 9.17 6.69 6.38 46.93 21.60 
1989 -13.84 -1.85 1.21 12.00 2.88 5.36 6.13 3.55 2.59 9.50 -1.20 7.22 7.36 5.87 4.75 41.74 18.36 
1990 -10.24 -1.84 1.14 13.67 4.77 4.34 5.27 4.13 4.79 7.52 -0.87 9.01 6.29 5.73 3.16 33.25 18.42 
a 5 1 : Organic chemicals 
52: Inorganic chemicals 
65 1 : Textile yarn 
652-655: Woven textiles 
672-675: Ingots and plates of iron and steel 
75: Office machinery 
761: Television receivers 
762: Radio receivers 85: Footwear 
763: Sound recorders and VTRs 
764: Telecommunication equipment 
775: Household electric equipment 
776: Thermionic valves and semiconductors 
781: Passenger motor vehicles 
784: Motor vehicle parts 
793: Ships and boats 
84: Apparel and accessories 
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and is GDP, a is a constant, e; and i; are weights (W:/Wo)/(W;/W*), and W 
is the volume of world trade. 
The Lafay indexes reveal how the specialization structure ev01ves.'~ In the 
case of Korea, apparel and accessories (SITC 84) ranked first in the list of 
RCA indexes in 1981 among the items that have comparative advantage (see 
table 9.16). It was followed by footwear (SITC SS),  woven textiles (SITC 652- 
655), television receivers (SITC 761), and ships (SITC 793). Among items 
with comparative disadvantage (with negative RCA indexes), organic chemi- 
cals (SITC 5 1) was the lowest. Telecommunications equipment (SITC 764), 
inorganic chemicals (SITC 52), and office machinery (SITC 75) in that order 
were among the next least advantageous items. 
In 1990, apparel and accessories, footwear, and woven textiles, in that order, 
still topped the list of items with comparative advantage. However, ships and 
passenger motor vehicles (SITC 781) ranked fourth and fifth, respectively; 
while television receivers ranked sixth, down from fourth. The ranking also 
changed on the comparative disadvantage side. Organic chemicals, inorganic 
chemicals, and motor vehicle parts (SITC 784) were still at the bottom. Yet 
two items, office machinery and telecommunications equipment, gained com- 
parative advantage in the middle of 1980s. 
In sum, apparel, footwear, and fabrics remained the three most important 
items with comparative advantage throughout the 1980s. But, as revealed by 
the narrowing of their surpluses, their strength has declined. On the other hand, 
the organic chemicals group had the greatest comparative disadvantage. How- 
ever, its deficit has been improving steadily. 
Textile yarn was the item whose comparative advantage was most seriously 
eroded. The comparative advantage of steel products such as iron ingots and 
plates also declined. Other items with declining comparative strength included 
television receivers, sound recorders and videotape recorders (VTRs), and 
household electric equipment. On the other hand, telecommunications equip- 
ment and passenger motor vehicles were the two most important items whose 
comparative advantages improved. Office machinery and semiconductors also 
enhanced their positions in the comparative advantage chain. 
During the I980s, Korea's comparative advantage structure changed dramat- 
ically. Most important, the spectrum (the range between the index values of 
the greatest comparative advantage and those of the greatest comparative dis- 
advantage items) narrowed, and the rank order changed. The specialization 
patterns have "deepened" in the sense that product diversification became eas- 
ier than before. These data suggest that Korea's trade structure changed rapidly 
in the 1980s-although less drastically near the end of the decade.I5 
14. The RCA indices of the 57 major import and export items (SITC three-digit) have been 
calculated in accordance with the Lafay method for the period 1981-90. These indexes reveal the 
evolution of comparative advantage for Korea's industries in the 1980s. The RCA indexes of 17 
major export goods are provided in table 9.16. 
15. The results shown in Lafay (1992) indicate that West Germany and Japan are the two most 
stable economies in the sense that their pattern of dynamic comparative advantages remained 
248 HonggueLee 
Korea’s comparative advantage structure could be compared with the RCA 
indexes of NAFTA members. The comparison of the sectoral comparative ad- 
vantage structure across countries should shed light on the patterns of Korea’s 
trade relationship with NAFTA countries. NAFTA members’ comparative 
strengths reflected in their respective trade data would reveal whether Korea’s 
trade with those countries is consistent with the pattern of comparative advan- 
tage and whether Korea’s trade relationship with NAFTA members is comple- 
mentary or competitive.’6 
RCA indexes should be comparable across different countries. For that pur- 
pose, 24 common export items (SITC three-digit) have been selected for which 
national rankings are given. The export items have been graded according to 
their RCA values for four selected years: 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992. 
The chain of comparative advantage is listed in tables 9.17 and 9.18 for each 
of six countries and the European Community. As evidenced by the list, Korea 
was able to maintain comparative advantage in 12 to 14 sectors in the four 
selected years. For instance, Korea continued to have comparative advantage 
in footwear (SITC SSl), man-made fabrics (SITC 653j, ships and boats (SITC 
793), and passenger motor vehicles (SITC 781). On the other hand, Korea had 
comparative disadvantage in petroleum products (SITC 334) and measuring 
and controlling instruments (SITC 874). 
Canada maintained comparative advantage in 10 to 11 sectors except for 
1988, when it had comparative advantage only in 8 sectors. Canada continued 
to have comparative advantage in paper products (SITC 641 j, crude oil (SITC 
333), fertilizers (SITC 562), passenger motor vehicles (SITC 781), and iron 
(SITC 672-674). On the other hand, Canada’s greatest comparative disad- 
vantage lay in labor-intensive manufactured goods. Canada imported labor- 
intensive manufactured products and consumer goods from the Asia Pacific 
region and exported natural resources and resource-based products. 
The number of sectors in which Mexico had comparative advantage contin- 
ued to increase from 4 in 1980 to 9 in 1988, but it declined to 5 in 1992. 
Mexico’s comparative advantage lay in crude oil (SITC 333j, textile yam 
(SITC 651), passenger motor vehicles (SITC 781), and internal combustion 
engines (SITC 713). Mexico had comparative disadvantage in motor vehicle 
parts (SITC 784), metalworking machine tools (SITC 736), and textile and 
leather machinery (SITC 724). 
unchanged over the 1967-86 period. On the other hand, Brazil exemplifies a rapidly changing 
economy with volatile comparative advantage chains. 
Comparative advantage is distinct from competitiveness. Two essential points can be identified. 
First, competitiveness is related to the relative strength or weakness of a country in producing a 
given product, while comparative advantage is related to the strength or weakness of products for 
a given country. Second, competitiveness is often subject to macroeconomic fluctuations (ex- 
change rate or wage rate), while comparative advantage is structural. See Lafay (1992) for details. 
16. The following discussion of RCA indexes draws on the background papers of APEC coun- 
tries submitted to the Pacific Economic Outlook Structural Meeting, held in Osaka, 27-28 Septem- 
ber, 1993. See Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (1994) for details. 
Table 9.17 Lafay RCA Rankings by SITC Code 
EClO us .  Canada Mexico Japan China Korea 
78 1 
82 I 
784 
724 
736 
713 
674 
673 
874 
65 I 
793 
672 
653 
562 
792 
85 1 
11 
894 
776 
752 
334 
81 
64 1 
333 
78 1 
784 
792 
674 
724 
736 
82 1 
713 
67 3 
793 
874 
672 
653 
85 1 
65 1 
I 1  
562 
894 
776 
752 
81 
64 1 
334 
333 
(continued) 
792 
752 
874 
81 
784 
713 
562 
65 1 
793 
653 
776 
672 
724 
736 
82 1 
11 
894 
673 
64 1 
674 
85 1 
334 
781 
333 
792 
874 
81 
752 
784 
562 
65 1 
793 
713 
653 
11 
672 
724 
736 
776 
821 
673 
894 
64 1 
85 1 
674 
334 
78 1 
333 
64 1 
562 
334 
673 
674 
11 
793 
78 1 
81 
672 
82 1 
724 
65 1 
653 
85 1 
894 
752 
792 
776 
736 
874 
713 
784 
333 
641 
78 1 
333 
562 
11 
334 
674 
673 
821 
81 
672 
793 
724 
792 
65 1 
653 
85 1 
894 
736 
776 
874 
752 
713 
784 
Year = 1980 
333 
65 1 
85 1 
821 
334 
653 
11 
752 
776 
894 
81 
562 
781 
673 
793 
64 1 
672 
713 
874 
792 
724 
736 
674 
784 
Year = 1984 
333 
334 
713 
781 
65 1 
894 
85 1 
672 
82 1 
673 
653 
81 
64 1 
792 
11 
724 
674 
752 
874 
776 
562 
784 
736 
793 
78 1 
674 
793 
673 
653 
784 
713 
776 
736 
672 
724 
65 1 
894 
64 1 
874 
562 
82 1 
752 
85 1 
81 
792 
11 
334 
333 
78 1 
674 
793 
784 
673 
653 
736 
776 
713 
752 
724 
894 
874 
672 
65 1 
64 1 
821 
562 
85 1 
81 
792 
11 
334 
333 
894 
874 
85 I 
82 1 
793 
792 
784 
78 1 
776 
752 
736 
724 
713 
674 
673 
672 
653 
65 1 
641 
562 
334 
333 
81 
11 
894 
874 
85 1 
82 1 
793 
792 
784 
78 1 
776 
752 
736 
724 
713 
674 
673 
672 
653 
65 1 
64 1 
562 
334 
333 
81 
11 
85 1 
653 
65 1 
674 
894 
5 62 
673 
793 
64 1 
781 
821 
11 
81 
776 
752 
784 
874 
724 
736 
672 
713 
792 
334 
333 
85 I 
793 
653 
894 
65 1 
674 
562 
673 
334 
78 1 
82 1 
752 
64 1 
776 
I1 
81 
784 
672 
792 
736 
713 
874 
724 
333 
Table 9.17 (continued) 
~ 
EClO us.  Canada Mexico Japan China Korea 
78 1 
784 
793 
674 
724 
776 
736 
673 
792 
874 
713 
82 1 
65 1 
653 
11 
672 
85 1 
894 
81 
752 
562 
641 
334 
333 
I1 
784 
724 
792 
736 
674 
793 
781 
673 
874 
713 
653 
82 1 
672 
65 1 
85 1 
776 
894 
81 
752 
562 
334 
641 
333 
792 
81 
874 
562 
752 
793 
65 1 
11 
653 
736 
724 
672 
776 
713 
673 
784 
674 
82 1 
641 
894 
85 1 
334 
78 1 
333 
792 
874 
81 
562 
11 
793 
65 1 
736 
784 
653 
776 
713 
724 
672 
752 
673 
821 
641 
674 
894 
85 1 
334 
781 
333 
333 
641 
78 1 
562 
11 
334 
673 
81 
82 1 
672 
793 
724 
674 
65 1 
653 
85 1 
736 
894 
874 
776 
752 
713 
792 
784 
333 
641 
78 1 
562 
334 
673 
672 
11 
792 
674 
81 
793 
724 
82 1 
65 1 
736 
653 
851 
894 
874 
776 
752 
713 
784 
Year = 1988 
333 
713 
78 1 
65 1 
673 
752 
85 1 
562 
334 
641 
82 1 
894 
672 
776 
793 
653 
674 
81 
874 
736 
724 
792 
11 
784 
Year = 1992 
333 
78 1 
713 
65 1 
562 
793 
776 
85 1 
894 
672 
752 
821 
653 
792 
81 
641 
674 
724 
874 
673 
11 
736 
334 
784 
781 
784 
674 
713 
793 
776 
752 
736 
724 
673 
653 
874 
64 1 
672 
65 1 
894 
562 
821 
85 1 
81 
792 
11 
334 
333 
781 
784 
793 
674 
713 
776 
724 
752 
736 
673 
65 3 
874 
334 
641 
65 1 
894 
672 
562 
821 
85 1 
792 
81 
11 
333 
333 
81 
85 1 
11 
894 
653 
821 
334 
672 
793 
713 
752 
736 
641 
781 
784 
792 
776 
874 
65 1 
724 
673 
674 
5 62 
333 
85 1 
894 
821 
11 
81 
793 
752 
673 
713 
672 
874 
784 
736 
653 
781 
641 
792 
334 
65 1 
674 
724 
562 
776 
85 1 
781 
793 
653 
894 
752 
673 
65 1 
674 
82 1 
562 
672 
64 1 
11 
776 
81 
713 
784 
724 
334 
736 
874 
792 
333 
793 
65 3 
85 1 
781 
674 
752 
894 
776 
673 
65 1 
562 
82 1 
672 
641 
784 
81 
713 
724 
11 
736 
874 
792 
334 
333 
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Table 9.17 (continued) 
Sources: United Nations, International Trade Statistical Yearbook (New York, 1984, 1992); Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., 1994). 
724: Textile and leather machinery 
8 1 : Animal feed 736: Metalworking machine tools 
333: Crude oil 752: Automatic data-processing machines 
334: Petroleum products 776: Thermionic valves, tubes, photocells 
562: Fertilizers 78 1 : Passenger motor vehicles 
641: Paper products 784: Motor vehicle parts 
651: Textile yarn 792: Aircraft 
653: Man-made fabrics 793: Ships and boats 
672: Iron, ingots 821: Furniture 
673: Iron, steel shapes 85 1 : Footwear 
674: Steel shapes and steel plates 874: Measuring and controlling instruments 
713: Internal combustion engines 8Y4: Toys, games, and sporting goods 
11: Meat 
The United States had comparative advantage in 12 sectors in 1980. But 
since then it has maintained comparative advantage in only 7 to 9 sectors. 
The United States’ comparative advantage remained in aircraft (SITC 792), 
measuring and controlling instruments (SITC 874), and fertilizers (SITC 562). 
Automatic data-processing machines (SITC 752) was in the comparative ad- 
vantage chain, but it lost its place in 1992. By contrast, motor vehicle parts 
(SITC 784) regained comparative advantage in 1992 after a lapse in 1988. On 
the other hand, the United States had comparative disadvantage in passenger 
motor vehicles (SITC 781), footwear (SITC 851), and iron shapes, plates, and 
sheets (SITC 673-674). 
While the comparative advantage chain of an individual country reveals its 
vertical structure of trade specialization, a comparison of comparative advan- 
tage chains between a country outside an FTA and member countries would 
reveal the extent to which one country’s export commodities could be eclipsed 
by “internal source exports.” The number of sectors in which both Korea and 
Mexico had comparative advantage was 6 (out of 16 sectors in which either 
had comparative advantage) in 1988: passenger motor vehicles, textile yarn, 
iron, steel shapes, automatic data-processing equipment, footwear, and fertiliz- 
ers. But in 1992, Korea’s export commodities were matched by Mexico’s in 
only 3 (out of 17) sectors: passenger motor vehicles, textile yarn, and fertil- 
izers. 
Korea and the United States had common comparative advantage in around 
3 to 5 sectors (out of 19 to 24 sectors in which one country had comparative 
advantage). For example, in 1992 Korea’s commodity items overlapped U.S. 
commodity items in the automatic data-processing equipment, fertilizer, and 
textile yarn sectors. On the other hand, the number of matched export com- 
modities between Korea and Canada was around 4 to 6 (out of 22 to 23). In 
1992, Korea’s export items overlapped Canadian export items in 4 sectors: pas- 
senger motor vehicles, fertilizers, iron, and steel shapes and steel plates. In 
view of these results, the extent to which Korea’s export commodity items 
compete with those of the United States, Canada, and Mexico is limited. This 
Table 9.18 Lafay RCA Indexes 
SITC" EClO U.S. Canada Mexico Japan China Korea 
11 
81 
333 
334 
562 
64 1 
65 1 
653 
672 
673 
674 
713 
724 
736 
752 
776 
78 1 
784 
792 
793 
821 
85 1 
874 
894 
11 
81 
333 
334 
562 
641 
65 I 
653 
612 
673 
674 
713 
724 
736 
752 
776 
781 
784 
792 
793 
821 
85 1 
874 
894 
-0.27 
-1.16 
-23.03 
-0.67 
0.08 
-1.54 
0.16 
0.13 
0.13 
0.55 
0.77 
0.77 
0.88 
0.85 
-0.49 
-0.49 
2.44 
1.76 
0.03 
0.13 
2.02 
-0.00 
0.25 
-0.31 
0.02 
-1.20 
-22.32 
-3.06 
-0.11 
-1.45 
0.16 
0.18 
0.28 
0.46 
1.17 
0.49 
0.98 
0.93 
-0.72 
-0.49 
2.34 
1.37 
I .25 
0.43 
0.81 
0.17 
0.39 
-0.23 
-0.27 
1.01 
- 15.45 
-3.69 
0.41 
-0.46 
0.21 
0.14 
0.02 
-0.44 
-0.58 
0.57 
-0.08 
-0.12 
1.43 
0.05 
-4.56 
0.71 
3.57 
0.21 
-0.26 
-1.04 
1.23 
-0.37 
-0.12 
0.50 
-11.97 
-3.69 
0.14 
-0.78 
0.02 
-0.08 
-0.14 
-0.64 
- 1.20 
-0.08 
-0.25 
-0.30 
0.44 
-0.32 
-4.67 
0.23 
1.92 
0.02 
-0.54 
-1.18 
0.70 
-0.66 
Year = 1980 
0.72 -0.20 
0.25 
- 10.41 
2.41 
3.57 
12.33 
-0.75 
-0.89 
0.11 
0.97 
0.84 
-4.65 
-0.70 
-1.86 
- 1.06 
- 1.25 
0.43 
-8.11 
- 1.23 
0.59 
-0.12 
-0.90 
-2.27 
-0.91 
-0.38 
18.88 
0.00 
-0.46 
-0.93 
0.57 
-0.16 
-0.94 
-0.61 
-2.78 
-1.07 
-1.68 
-2.01 
-0.23 
-0.27 
-0.52 
-5.73 
-1.37 
-0.75 
0.06 
0.16 
-1.11 
-0.29 
Year = 1984 
0.82 -0.31 
0.11 
5.26 
0.68 
3.19 
10.37 
-0.60 
-0.81 
0.03 
0.49 
0.5 1 
-2.62 
-0.52 
-0.91 
-1.58 
-0.99 
7.74 
-7.31 
-0.52 
-0.38 
0.47 
-0.82 
- 1.07 
-0.89 
-0.18 
37.34 
3.65 
-0.64 
-0.22 
0.30 
-0.15 
-0.13 
-0.15 
-0.40 
3.05 
-0.39 
-1.05 
-0.50 
-0.59 
0.44 
-0.71 
-0.28 
-1.37 
-0.15 
0.09 
0.30 
-0.56 
-1.35 
-0.5 1 
-26.62 
-5.71 
0.05 
0.31 
0.61 
2.11 
1.17 
2.86 
4.55 
1.54 
1.11 
1.22 
-0.18 
1.46 
12.64 
1.91 
-0.85 
3.70 
-0.07 
-0.20 
0.14 
0.55 
- 1.60 
-0.34 
-32.01 
-4.41 
-0.11 
0.22 
0.28 
1.78 
0.34 
2.37 
3.98 
1.63 
1.18 
1.72 
1.36 
1.68 
10.97 
2.78 
-0.61 
3.11 
-0.08 
-0.21 
0.34 
0.39 
0.14 
-0.09 
-57.39 
-7.45 
4.78 
0.88 
7.63 
9.86 
-2.80 
2.71 
5.88 
-3.31 
-2.40 
-2.58 
-1.31 
-0.14 
0.79 
- 1.62 
-3.43 
2.12 
0.47 
13.17 
-2.08 
4.81 
-0.68 
-0.81 
-74.99 
1.55 
2.29 
-0.28 
4.30 
9.97 
-1.32 
2.04 
3.21 
-2.38 
-2.81 
-1.85 
0.03 
-0.29 
1.51 
- 1.08 
- 1.62 
10.50 
0.63 
12.19 
-2.69 
6.02 
Table 9.18 (continued) 
SITC" EClO U.S. Canada Mexico Japan China Korea 
11 
81 
333 
334 
562 
64 1 
65 1 
653 
672 
673 
674 
713 
724 
736 
752 
776 
78 1 
784 
792 
793 
821 
85 1 
874 
894 
11 
81 
333 
334 
562 
64 1 
65 1 
653 
672 
673 
674 
713 
724 
736 
752 
776 
781 
7x4 
792 
793 
82 1 
85 1 
874 
894 
0.00 
-0.53 
- 18.34 
-2.29 
-0.76 
-1.15 
0.10 
0.04 
-0.03 
0.33 
0.76 
0.24 
0.70 
0.59 
-0.67 
0.70 
1.32 
0.93 
0.33 
0.82 
0.16 
-0.04 
0.32 
-0.32 
17.93 
-0.53 
-23.47 
-0.82 
-0.77 
-1.07 
0.00 
0.10 
0.05 
0.34 
0.46 
0.14 
0.78 
0.48 
-0.54 
-0.35 
0.45 
0.86 
0.50 
0.46 
0.09 
-0.16 
0.19 
-0.36 
0.01 
0.58 
- 14.88 
-3.61 
0.15 
-0.63 
0.06 
-0.06 
-0.14 
-0.47 
-0.52 
-0.34 
-0.12 
-0.11 
0.14 
-0.17 
-3.94 
-0.51 
2.34 
0.08 
-0.53 
-1.02 
0.53 
-0.68 
0.22 
0.57 
- 19.59 
-2.37 
0.32 
-0.32 
0.06 
-0.05 
-0.17 
-0.22 
-0.40 
-0.12 
-0.13 
0.01 
-0.17 
-0.11 
-2.70 
0.00 
2.48 
0.16 
-0.30 
-0.97 
0.61 
-0.57 
Year = 1988 
0.50 -1.74 
0.00 
8.24 
0.32 
I .63 
7.75 
-0.48 
-0.53 
-0.24 
0.29 
-0.40 
-2.17 
-0.32 
-0.71 
-1.27 
-0.81 
3.43 
-5.13 
-2.25 
-0.24 
-0.01 
-0.71 
-0.80 
-0.75 
-0.69 
67.12 
0.05 
0.09 
-0.03 
0.83 
-0.52 
-0.20 
0.29 
-0.63 
4.22 
-1.00 
-0.95 
0.20 
-0.23 
1.51 
-2.44 
-1.05 
-0.30 
-0.11 
0.14 
-0.92 
-0.17 
Year = 1992 
0.28 -1.98 
-0.00 
12.95 
2.04 
2.67 
7.53 
-0.21 
-0.38 
0.48 
0.65 
0.03 
-2.94 
-0.19 
-0.34 
-1.15 
-1.00 
3.84 
-4.30 
0.13 
-0.06 
-0.19 
-0.69 
-0.89 
-0.72 
-0.87 
58.12 
-3.69 
0.32 
-0.91 
0.49 
-0.66 
-0.42 
- 1.45 
-0.92 
I .60 
-0.97 
-2.06 
-0.45 
-0.15 
4.48 
- 10.08 
-0.76 
-0.08 
-0.51 
-0.18 
- 1.37 
- 0.4 1 
-1.30 
-0.24 
- 16.57 
-3.90 
-0.11 
0.04 
-0.06 
0.50 
-0.04 
0.59 
1.64 
1.24 
0.65 
0.88 
0.90 
1.13 
5.44 
1.90 
-0.49 
1.14 
-0.15 
-0.23 
0.35 
-0.07 
- 1.45 
-0.44 
-22.52 
0.30 
-0.09 
0.11 
0.06 
0.44 
-0.02 
0.54 
1.57 
1.34 
0.99 
0.91 
0.95 
1.07 
5.17 
2.07 
-0.41 
1.76 
-0.19 
-0.28 
0.43 
0.01 
1.02 
1.76 
25.56 
0.11 
-7.16 
-0.85 
-2.01 
0.46 
-0.10 
-2.95 
-5.02 
-0.23 
-2.37 
-0.81 
-0.45 
-1.32 
-1.11 
-1.12 
-1.16 
-0.11 
0.33 
1.57 
- 1.32 
0.63 
0.72 
0.20 
9.95 
-3.16 
-9.11 
-2.18 
-4.19 
-1.76 
- 1.25 
-0.93 
-4.61 
-1.12 
-5.16 
- 1.73 
-0.11 
-12.18 
-2.08 
- 1.42 
-2.41 
-0.10 
1.09 
5.64 
-1.39 
3.74 
0.00 
-0.87 
-53.94 
- 1.92 
0.57 
0.10 
0.97 
7.22 
0.28 
1.20 
0.88 
-1.14 
- 1.71 
-1.92 
1.60 
-0.19 
10.01 
-1.31 
-5.87 
7.48 
0.64 
10.62 
-2.87 
3.90 
-1.36 
-1.01 
-85.66 
-4.65 
0.34 
-0.24 
0.46 
7.35 
-0.00 
0.5 1 
4.13 
-1.20 
-1.31 
-2.68 
1.06 
0.80 
4.59 
-0.82 
-3.02 
8.28 
0.11 
5.17 
-2.75 
0.93 
Sources: United Nations, International Trade Statistical Yearbook (New York, 1984, 1992); Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washinton, D.C., 1994). 
5 e e  table 9.17 note for key to SITC numbers. 
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limited competition implies that Korea’s trade pattern is “complementary” to 
those of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.” As a result, the extent of 
overall trade diversion is expected to be limited. 
Trade Elasticities 
Potential trade diversion away from Korea due to NAFTA is relatively weak, 
as evidenced by “qualitative” indicators. Yet, it remains to be seen to what 
extent the effects of NAFTA on Korea can be quantified. The scope of trade 
diversion is determined by the size of preferential treatment and the efficiency 
loss attributable to replacement of more efficient nonmember suppliers. Prefer- 
ential liberalization within an FTA changes the relative prices of goods pro- 
duced in member countries and goods originating outside the FTA. The import 
source is then switched from more efficient outside suppliers to less efficient, 
but preferentially treated, member suppliers. In this regard, it is of interest to 
assess the responsiveness of exports or imports to changes in relative prices. 
A production theory approach is a convenient way to measure the possible 
scope of trade diversion resulting from NAFTA. In this approach, price elastic- 
ities are derived from a restricted profit function that has aggregator functions 
as net outputs or from aggregator functions at the sublevel, both of which retain 
the properties of the neoclassical production function. Own price elasticity 
measures the extent of reduction in Korean exports directly attributable to a 
change in relative prices due to NAFTA. Cross-price elasticity assesses the 
substitution possibilities between, for example, NAFTA and other destinations. 
When the cross-price elasticity of two particular destinations is negative, ex- 
ports to these two markets are substitutes rather than complements. That is, an 
increase of export price in one of these destinations will result in an increase 
in the amount of exports to the other. Thus, price elasticities combined with 
data on trade barriers can be used to infer the percentage reduction in Korean 
exports to NAFTA (see appendix tables 9A.1, 9A.2, and 9A.3 for the follow- 
ing discussion.) 
The own price elasticity of Korea’s export supply has ranged from 2.2 to 2.9 
since 1980. Korea’s export supply has been very responsive to price change. 
For instance, in 1993 a 1 percent increase in the export price level would have 
increased Korea’s total export supply by 2.68 percent. But Korea’s import de- 
mand is not so elastic with respect to price change. The own price elasticity of 
Korea’s import demand was much less than 1 throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, reflecting the relatively inflexible demand for imports. In 1993, for ex- 
17. Number of Sectors with Common Comparative Advantage 
1980 1984 1988 1992 
~ 
Korea4J.S. 4/24 311 9 5/22 3/21 
Korea-Canada 6/22 5/23 4/22 4/22 
Korea-Mexico 3/16 4/19 6/23 3/11 
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Table 9.19 Korean Exports to the U.S. Market, 1992 
Export Type 
Amount 
Number of Items (million US.$) 
A. Korea’s exports to the United States 5,003 16,230.638 
B. Korea’s exports to the United States matched by Mexico’s 14,419.833 
C. No-tariff exports 361 2,899.200 
D. Mexico’s exports under GSP 2,444 6,032.5 18 
E. Exports directly affected by NAFTA 1,122 5,488.115 
3,921 
Source; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, unpublished internal source (1994). 
ample, a 1 percent increase in the import price level would have decreased 
Korea’s import demand merely by 0.06 percent. 
Elasticities with regard to export destinations (import sources) show re- 
gional response subject to a fixed aggregate labor input and a given level of 
aggregate exports (imports). Own price elasticities of Korea’s exports to North 
America have continuously stayed above 5.0 throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s. Own price elasticities are much lower for Japan (1.65-1.84), the Euro- 
pean Community (1.77-2. lo), and APEC (1.25-1.65) during the same period. 
These results imply that Korea’s exports to the North American market are 
more sensitive to relative price changes than its exports elsewhere. Imports 
from North America also exhibit a very high price responsiveness, with own 
price elasticities ranging from -2.48 to -3.87, while those from Japan range 
from -1.96 to -3.60. Own price elasticities are low for both the European 
Community and APEC. 
Price elasticities and the NAFTA tariff reduction schedule have been com- 
bined to calculate the impact effect of NAFTA on Korea’s exports to the U.S. 
market. The calculation has been applied to Korea’s exports to the U.S. market 
in 1992. As a proxy for the “NAFTA effect” on tariff rates, applied U.S. tariffs 
on East Asian exporters have been used.’* Obviously, the tariff margins are not 
translated into an increase in “net” export price. The net export price that the 
exporters face is likely to fall as a result of NAFTA. In the present calculation, 
it has been assumed that 50 percent of tariff margins are translated into depres- 
sion of the net export price. 
The product of the price elasticity and the trade barrier figure yields the 
percentage reduction in Korean exports attributable to preferential liberaliza- 
tion of the North American market. Among all the export items in 1992, 1,122 
items ($5.5 billion) would be directly affected by NAFTA (see table 9.19). The 
resulting reduction in Korea’s exports to the U.S. market would amount to 
around 1.7 percent ($274 million) of its total exports. Leather goods ($53 mil- 
lion) and textiles and apparel ($112 million) would be most seriously affected. 
Steel products ($36 million) and footwear ($29 million) would also be substan- 
18. These data have been adopted from Pnmo Braga et al. (1994, tables 2 and 4). 
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Table 9.20 Reduction in Exports, 1992 (million U.S. dollars) 
Sector 
Exports to Directly Affected Expected 
United States by NAFTA Reduction A/C 
(A) (B) (C) (%) 
Chemical products 
Leather goods 
Textiles and apparel 
Footwear 
Steel products 
Nonferrous metals 
Machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Automobiles 
Mix .  manufactures 
Total 
66 1 
1,040 
2,529 
1,527 
893 
191 
1.97 1 
4,961 
860 
1,598 
16,231 
31 
936 
1,744 
1,020 
679 
42 
38 
538 
298 
164 
5,488 
2 
53 
112 
29 
36 
1 
1 
19 
10 
11 
274 
0.3 
5.1 
4.4 
1.9 
4.0 
0.7 
0.1 
0.4 
1.2 
0.7 
1.7 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, unpublished internal source (1994). 
tially affected (see table 9.20). The results of the present calculation fall within 
the range suggested by other studies.I9 
9.3.2 “Hidden Protectionism”: Selected Sectoral Impacts 
Prospective diversion effects due to NAFTA will be felt differently by each 
sector. Highly protected sectors are more likely to cause trade and investment 
diversion. The possibilities for trade and investment diversion are likely to be 
most pronounced in those sectors, such as agriculture, automobiles, textiles 
and apparel, and iron and steel, where existing trade barriers are relatively high 
or the rules of origin are strict. 
Textiles and Apparel 
The textiles and apparel sector has been heavily protected in both Canadian 
and U.S. markets. As a result of NAFTA, however, all tariffs on textiles and 
apparel will be eliminated within 10 years. Tariffs between the United States 
and Mexico will be phased out in six years. Moreover, U.S. quotas on Mexican 
textile and apparel products will be immediately eliminated, provided that the 
Mexican products satisfy the new rules of origin. The elimination of tariffs and 
quotas on Mexican products will enhance Mexico’s price competitiveness vis- 
8-vis Korea in low- to medium-priced products, whose competitiveness has 
already been eclipsed by China and East Asian NIEs. Mexico’s share in the 
U.S. market (apparel sector) increased from 2 percent in the early 1980s to 6 
percent in 1992. On the other hand, the phasing out of the MFA in 10 years 
following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round will mitigate the adverse effect 
on the competitiveness of Korean producers vis-8-vis Mexican producers. 
19. E.g., Noland (n.d.) reported export diversion losses in the range of 1-3 percent of Korea’s 
total exports. 
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While eliminating tariffs and quotas on intraregional trade, NAFTA estab- 
lished protective rules of origin for textiles and apparel. The new rules of origin 
make more difficult the conditions for preferential treatment. To qualify for 
NAFTA preferences, finished products must pass a “triple transformation test,” 
which virtually requires that products be made of North American fibers (Huf- 
bauer and Schott 1993,44). This rule of origin is much stricter than the existing 
rule in CUSFTA, which requires a “double transformation” in order to qualify 
for FTA preferential treatment. 
Among 1,239 textile items (HS 10-digit) exported to the U.S. market in 
1992, Korean producers have 586 items directly competing with Mexican 
products. When the items subject to duty exemptions or the Generalized Sys- 
tem of Preferences (GSP) are excluded, 543 items ($1.74 billion) will be di- 
rectly influenced by NAFTA. This adds up to around 43.8 percent (or 69.0 
percent) of the total number (or the total amount) of textile products exported 
to the U.S. market. The corresponding amount of export reduction is estimated 
to be around $112 million (4.4 percent of the total amount).20 
Korea’s market share of the footwear sector in the United States decreased 
from 26 percent in 1989 to 15 percent in 1992. Among 186 footwear products 
exported to the U.S. market, 87 items ($1.02 billion) are expected to be af- 
fected by NAFTA. The expected reduction in exports to the U.S. market due 
to the preferential treatment of Mexico amounts to around $29 million (1.9 
percent of the total). 
The United States has maintained higher tariff rates on leather imports than 
the average tariff rate imposed on manufacturing goods. NAFTA will phase 
out tariffs on Mexican leather goods in 10 years. Most Korean producers of 
leather goods have not exported their products under their own brand names. 
With the rapid emergence of Chinese and Thai competitors in lower-end prod- 
ucts, Korea’s market share in the United States decreased from almost 29 per- 
cent ($1.5 billion) in 1989 to 19 percent ($1.0 billion) in 1992. On the other 
hand, Mexico’s share slightly increased from 2.2 percent in 1989 to 2.7 percent 
in 1992. Korea exported 127 leather products, in 50 items ($936 million) of 
which Korea and Mexico directly compete with each other. The reduction in 
20. As the fourth largest exporter of textiles to the U.S. market, Korea’s textile industry holds a 
large amount of quotas. At the same time, Korea’s quota utilization rate is so high that 90 percent 
of Korea’s textile goods were exported out of quotas in 1993. Thus, a question arises as to whether 
it is meaningful to estimate the effects of price changes on Korea’s textile exports to the United 
States. ’ b o  excuses can be made for following the production theory approach in the current 
study: the equivalence between tariffs and quotas and the characteristics of the data used in the 
estimation process. 
In calculating “NAFTA effects,” “US.  tariff margins on East Asian exporters” (Pnmo Braga et 
al. 1994) were used as approximate measures reflecting both tariff and nontariff barriers. This kind 
of exercise can be justified in the case where there exists a basic equivalence between tariffs and 
quotas in perfectly competitive markets. In this regard, U.S. tariff rates used in the calculation of 
NAFTA effects were indeed “tariff equivalents” of tariff and nontariff barriers. The production 
model used in the estimation process posits perfect competition. Given these constraints, however, 
the estimates on textiles and apparel reported in table 9.20 should be interpreted as at best first- 
order approximation. 
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leather exports due to NAFTA is estimated to be around $53 million (5.1 per- 
cent of the total). 
Electrical Machinery and Electronic Goods 
Korea’s market share of electrical machinery and electronic goods in the 
U.S. market was 8.9 percent ($5.2 billion) in 1989, but it was down to 7.3 
percent ($5.0 billion) in 1992. On the other hand, Mexico’s share increased 
from 12.6 percent ($7.3 billion) in 1989 to 14.0 percent ($9.6 billion) in 1992. 
In 1992 Korea was the third biggest exporter of electronic components and 
accessories to the U.S. market with its market share of 9.6 percent ($2.18 bil- 
lion). The top two exporters were Japan (28.9 percent, $6.6 billion) and Canada 
(10.7 percent, $2.4 billion). Korea was followed by Malaysia and Mexico, 
whose market shares were 9.5 percent ($2.17 billion) and 8.3 percent ($1.9 
billion), respectively. Among other items, Korea has focused on semiconduc- 
tors and related devices, and its share was 13.0 percent ($1.98 billion out of a 
total $15.3 billion).21 
In 1992 Korea was the fifth largest exporter of computer equipment with a 
share of 4.3 percent ($1.4 billion). Korea was preceded by Japan (34.9 percent, 
$11.2 billion), Singapore (17.1 percent, $5.5 billion), Taiwan (13.7 percent, 
$4.4 billion), and Canada (6.9 percent, $2.2 billion). On 13 computer products 
that Korea exports, the United States maintains tariffs. However, as the United 
States had already given Canada and Mexico tariff exemptions before NAFTA, 
the effects of the preferential arrangement on Korean computer exports would 
not be substantial. On the other hand, the new rules of origin require third- 
country producers to use electron tubes made in North America to be eligible 
for NAFTA preferences. But the huge fixed investment cost is likely to prevent 
Korean producers from setting up tube-producing plants. 
Korea exported 621 kinds of electronic products to the U.S. market in 1992, 
but it competed with Mexico in only 19 percent of those items (118 items, 
$537 million). The preferential treatment of Mexico is estimated to reduce 
Korea’s exports to the U.S. market by around $19 million (0.4 percent of the 
total). 
Steel Mill Products 
Korea has experienced a reduction in steel exports to the U.S. market due 
to the worldwide recession that began 1989 and a series of bilateral disputes 
that followed the expiration of a voluntary restraint agreement. Korea’s exports 
to the U.S. market were recorded at $893 million in 1992, which was less than 
the amount of previous years. On the other hand, Mexico has been successful 
recently in increasing its export volume in the U.S. steel market. Mexican steel 
exports increased from $481 million in 1989 to $656 million in 1992. 
The major Mexican steel exports to the U.S. market were mostly lower- 
21. See the U.S. Department of Commerce (1994, chap. 15) for related statistics. 
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quality steel products such as semifinished steel, pipe and tube, and other sheet 
and strip, which used to constitute Korea’s major exports. Mexico expanded 
its steel production on the basis of relatively lower labor costs, while Korea 
specialized in more capital-intensive production such as plates. As a result, the 
extent of direct competition in the U.S. steel market between Mexico and 
Korea is not likely to be significant. 
Among 335 steel products exported to the U.S. market, in 112 items (worth 
$677 million) Korea competed with Mexico. In view of this situation, the de- 
gree of export reduction is expected to be $36 million (4.0 percent of the total). 
Automobiles 
NAFTA rules of origin for the motor vehicles sector stipulates that assem- 
bled autos contain 62.5 percent North American content in order to be eligible 
for duty-free treatment. This new rule is stricter than the existing one in CUS- 
FTA. Moreover, the new rule will eliminate duty-waiver programs for all U.S. 
imports of automotive products from Canada. This implies an end to preferen- 
tial duty waivers for foreign transplant producers in Canada such as Hyundai, 
Honda, Toyota, and General Motors-Suzuki (see Hufbauer and Schott 1992, 
161). As a result, the NAFTA rule of origin for the automotive sector will give 
the U.S. Big Three carmakers and their unionized workers an effective weapon 
with which to strike back at foreign transplant production in North America. 
Under NAFTA, the calculation of regional content will be based on a net-cost 
method that traces key foreign components to measure their North American 
content. Along with the stricter rules of origin, the new tracing test should 
eliminate the roll-up problem. 
Although rules of origin have become stricter, foreign producers who export 
assembled autos to the United States are likely to be less significantly affected 
by them than those foreign producers who export to Canada or Mexico. For- 
eign firms transplanted in North America will be forced to source more parts 
regionally if they want smoother access to the Canadian and Mexican markets. 
In 1992, Korea exported $860 million of automobile-related products to the 
United States, of which $101 million (12 percent of the total) were subject to 
the rules of origin test. On the other hand, Mexico exported $1.9 billion of 
automobile products to the United States, 37 percent of which were subject to 
the new origin rules. The high ratio of Mexican exports to Korean exports 
affected by the new rules of origin indicates that the possibility of trade diver- 
sion is great. The reduction in automobile exports would be around $10 million 
(1.2 percent of total automobile exports). 
9.3.3 Investment Diversion 
With respect to the possibility of investment diversion, an important ques- 
tion arises as to whether regional firms (particularly U.S. firms) prefer a loca- 
tion within the region or whether they are truly global when looking for an 
export platform to serve the U.S. market. Regional integration is a natural re- 
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sult of geographical and cultural proximity, not the outcome of political negoti- 
ations. Regional arrangements, often initiated by those producers (in large part, 
multinational firms) who aim at taking advantage of a regional division of 
labor, help expedite trade and investment with neighboring countries, which 
has been “suppressed” by political barriers. In this regard, NAFTA is not the 
cause but the effect of “corporate” integration efforts on the part of U.S. pro- 
ducers. 
Trade and investment are influenced by preferential arrangements, but insti- 
tutional arrangements follow regional economic integration, not the other way 
around. No doubt NAFTA will invigorate intraregional investment, which is 
driven by the potential for a regional division of labor and by expectations of 
an enlarged market. Yet, export-oriented production in Mexico has enjoyed 
preferential treatment such as the GSP and the maquiladora program. These 
special treatments were allowed because U.S. multinationals wanted to use 
Canada and Mexico as export platforms. In view of this evidence, the amount 
of additional intraregional investment (and hence intrafirm trade) that would 
result from NAFTA should not be exaggerated. 
To the extent that geographical proximity is important in shaping patterns 
of trade and investment, the scope for investment (and intraregional trade) di- 
version is not likely to be substantial. Intrafirm trade in North America has 
always been regional. U.S. multinational firms have preferred neighboring 
countries. They account for most of the trade flow between the United States 
and Canada, which constitutes the largest bilateral trade flow in the world. 
These firms are also responsible for almost one-half of U.S. manufacturing 
imports from Mexico. American multinationals have long taken advantage of 
a regional division of labor through the U.S.-Canada Automotive Pact and the 
maquiladora program. At the same time, their Mexican affiliates are the most 
strongly oriented toward the U.S. market of affiliates in any major country. 
Thus, in the case of the North American market, there is clear evidence that 
regional firms have a regional bias in choosing their export locations to serve 
the U.S. market in almost all sectors. Even those firms that are regarded as 
global firms opt for a regional strategy, often resulting in multiregional produc- 
tion. For example, almost all U.S. intrafirm imports in the automotive sector 
come from Canada and Mexico. There is virtually no interregional trade 
among affiliates in the automotive sector. However, in other sectors, where 
standardized or “low value-added” products are traded, U.S. intrafirm imports 
are likely to come from countries other than Mexico and Canada. But in any 
case, interregional exports are less than what is sold locally and regionally. As 
multinational firms organize their production on a regional basis, intraregional 
trade prevails. 
Unless U.S. multinational firms are willing and able to pursue “complex 
integration strategies” and to change their structures accordingly, the geo- 
graphical scope of their international production will be confined to regional 
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clusters in North America and Latin America.22 The same tendency has been 
the case in the European Community and in East Asia. Many multinational 
firms are achieving their global objectives through a regional organization of 
“value chains.” In the future, competitive pressures are likely to force multina- 
tional firms to spread their activities more widely around the world. At present, 
however, only a few firms are involved in integrating production beyond the 
regional level and for only a limited number of corporate functions (see United 
Nations 1993, chap. 5 ) .  On the other hand, regional economic arrangements 
may restrict the growth of global strategies by establishing barriers to extrare- 
gional trade.23 
9.4 Concluding Remarks 
There are some signs of trade diversion away from Korea due to Mexico’s 
accession to CUSFTA. Yet the scope of trade diversion is not likely to be sig- 
nificant, as evidenced by the quantitative analysis of the present study. This 
observation, however, overlooks the structural changes associated with re- 
gional trade arrangements in which dynamic effects are generally much larger 
than static ones and in which potential effects are much larger than transitional 
and transformational realized effects. At the same time, regional arrangements 
are likely to have negative impacts on the perceptions and behavior of non- 
members. 
NAFTA is an ambitious vertical integration between disparate economies. 
Its success is likely to depend on market size effects applied at a regional or 
local level. Market size effects generate what amounts to an external economy, 
as they will eliminate uncertainty associated with increasing returns to scale.24 
Porter ( 1990) has emphasized the point that international competitiveness is 
often the product of successful geographical clusters among countries. Geo- 
graphic concentration is the most convincing evidence of the importance of 
external economies in real economies. In this regard, NAFTA will pose a great 
challenge for nonmembers, as it will enhance the competitiveness of the North 
American economy through externalities attributable to market size effects. 
22. See United Nations (1993) for a discussion of strategies of multinational firms regarding 
integrated international production. 
23. International trade is even more regionally concentrated than foreign direct investment 
(FDI). That pattern emerges from a comparison of shares of regional and other partners in interna- 
tional trade with their shares in FDI and, even more clearly, from a comparison of trade intensities 
with FDI intensities. Moreover, intrafirm trade between multinational parent firms and their affili- 
ates represents the largest share of world trade. Intrafirm trade often constitutes the only way in 
which services, technology, and patents are internally transferred. 
24. External economies are most likely to occur at the regional or local level rather than at the 
national or international level. Each individual manufacturing facility stayed within the manufac- 
turing belt because of the advantages of being near other manufacturers. See Krugman (1993) for 
this interesting observation. 
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Appendix 
Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities 
For the estimation of price elasticities, a producer theory approach is em- 
ployed. Drawing on an economy-wide GNP function that treats imports as an 
input to the production process and exports as an output, the producer approach 
generates export supply and import demand functions. These functions in turn 
can be used to calculate various elasticities with which the extent of trade re- 
placement can be estimated. The production theory approach was initiated by 
Kohli (1978), who regarded imports as an intermediate input into the produc- 
tion process and exports as an output not destined for domestic use. When 
imported goods are treated as intermediate goods, only the private production 
sector of the economy needs to be modeled. Then the difficult problems associ- 
ated with modeling the consumer sector can be avoided.25 
In this study, a restricted profit function (the GDP function) was used, which 
had domestic sales supply, capital, exports, and imports as aggregate net out- 
put. Labor input was assumed to be fixed. In addition, exports and imports 
each were disaggregated into four destinations and origins (namely, NAFTA, 
Japan, the European Community, and APEC 11). 
Specifically, let the production possibilities set for a country in period t be a 
set T, = {(x, v)}, where x is a vector of net outputs and v is a vector of primary 
inputs.Z6 Let p be the vector of domestic and international prices. Then the 
country’s restricted profit (GDP) function can be defined as 
n ( p ,  L )  = max { p ’ x  : (x, L ) E  T } ,  
where L is a vector of labor stocks utilized by the production sector in period 
t. The restricted profit function is supposed to satisfy the properties of the neo- 
classical profit function. Then, from Hotelling’s lemma, the net output supply 
functions are derived (from the derivatives of the restricted profit function with 
respect top): 
x = V p r I ( p ,  L).  
The net supply vector is the vector of first-order derivatives of the restricted 
profit function with respect to the components of the price vector.27 This system 
of equations contains the economy’s short-run domestic output supply, capital 
demand, export supply, and import demand functions. Constant returns to scale 
are assumed with respect to the labor stock. 
The functional form for the unit profit function adopted is the symmetric- 
25. This approach no doubt falls short of taking account of general equilibrium effects. The 
26. The subscript t will be suppressed in the following to reduce notational complexities. 
27. See Diewert and Momson (1988) for related discussion. 
resulting model is partial equilibrium in nature. Yet it is simple and straightforward. 
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normalized-quadratic function.** For the case of homogeneous labor, the re- 
stricted profit function in period t is defined as 
where s is the exogenous parameter, the variable T is a time trend indicating 
technical progress, and B, a, and d are parameters to be estimated subject to 
the Slutsky symmetry and Cournot aggregation conditions. The form of corre- 
sponding net output supply functions is 
si ~ p ’ B p  + ai + di * T .  xz - P‘B 
L p ’ s  2 (p’s)’ 
The restricted profit function is supposed to be globally convex in prices 
p .  This implies that the matrix of estimated coefficients B should be positive 
semidefinite. But when the estimated matrix is not positive semidefinite, the 
coefficient matrix is replaced by the product of a lower triangular matrix and 
its transpose to ensure the global convexity of the profit function. 
The estimated matrix B of the present model was not positive semidefinite: 
its eigenvalues were not all nonnegative. Thus, positive semidefiniteness had 
to be imposed on the coefficient matrix by a reparameterization that was de- 
signed by Wiley, Schmidt, and Bramble (1973). Reparameterization required 
replacing the matrix B by a product of two lower triangular matrices C and 
C’, where 
B = C C ’ ,  C = [c,]], cv = 0 f o r j  > i .  
Then the reparameterized system was estimated by means of nonlinear regres- 
sion methods (see table 9A.1). 
The export supply and import demand functions derived from the restricted 
profit functions are aggregator functions that can be disaggregated into compo- 
nents of exports and imports. With the assumption that exports and imports are 
weakly separable from the other inputs and outputs, a two-stage optimization 
process is possible in which the total demand for imports and supply of exports 
are estimated and then aggregate imports and exports are disaggregated in sep- 
arate submodels. Again a symmetric-normalized-quadratic function can be 
adopted for the disaggregation of the aggregator function. 
Then the unit profit function for export or import aggregates takes the form 
28. This is an adaptation of the generalized symmetric McFadden cost function defined in Diew- 
ert and Wales (1987). 
Table 9A.1 Parameter Estimates 
Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
GDP function 
D1 1.5798 
c11 0.2413 
c 2  1 -0.7926 
c22 -0.3784 
C3 1 0.1059 
C32 0.0661 
c33 0.0518 
B1 0.0202 
D2 2.2268 
B2 0.0140 
D3 -0.1615 
B3 -0.0004 
D4 0.3437 
B4 0.0115 
Iteration number 
Log-likelihood function 
Export aggregator 
F1 1.3403 
El l  -0.4873 
E2 1 -0.4524 
E22 -0.2189 
E3 1 -0.3468 
E32 -0.1575 
E33 0.1054 
A1 -0.0071 
F2 -0.4518 
A2 -0.0021 
F3 -0.5136 
A3 -0.0027 
F4 -0.2784 
A4 0.0116 
Iteration number 
Log-likelihood function 
Import aggregator 
H1 0.7797 
G11 1.0453 
G2 1 -0.0014 
G22 0.1272 
G3 1 -0.0635 
G32 -0.0347 
G33 -0.0446 
B1 0.0101 
H2 -0.6640 
B2 -0.0274 
H3 0.1555 
B3 0.0029 
H4 0.2353 
B4 0.0096 
Iteration number 
Log-likelihood function 
0.0298 
0.0475 
0.0776 
0.0995 
0.0208 
0.0362 
0.0272 
0.0033 
0.2002 
0.0250 
0.0557 
0.0021 
0.0196 
0.0007 
124 
143.6627 
0.0324 
0.0833 
0.0494 
0.1315 
0.0642 
0.1415 
0.0329 
0.0030 
0.1106 
0.0010 
0.0927 
0.0010 
0.0572 
0.0020 
300 
227.1960 
0.1066 
0.0560 
0.0133 
0.0444 
0.0447 
0.0245 
0.0411 
0.0012 
0.1621 
0.0018 
0.0176 
0.0004 
0.0369 
0.0006 
78 
221.9865 
52.9340 
5.0792 
- 10.2080 
-3.8037 
5.0940 
1.8247 
1.9029 
6.0969 
11.1250 
0.5582 
-2.9010 
-0.2055 
17.5010 
15.4040 
41.3270 
-5.8482 
-9.1527 
- 1.6644 
-5.4011 
- 1.1125 
3.1995 
-2.3690 
-4.0843 
-2.0475 
-5.5395 
-2.6022 
-4.8692 
5.6780 
7.3127 
18.6660 
-0.1037 
2.8667 
-1.4212 
- 1.4161 
-1.0851 
8.4094 
-4.0954 
- 14.9700 
8.8200 
7.3249 
6.3729 
15.6030 
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where s is the exogenous parameter, the variable 7 is a time trend indicating 
technical progress, and F, e ,  and g are parameters to be estimated subject to 
the Slutsky symmetry and Cournot aggregation conditions. The form of corre- 
sponding net output supply functions is given byz9 
The disaggregation of aggregator functions can be made according to the 
types of commodities and services or the origins and destinations of exports 
and imports. For the purpose of assessing the scope of trade diversion, disag- 
gregation based on the geographical distribution of foreign trade is more use- 
ful. A closer look at the geographical composition will uncover some informa- 
tion concerning the substitution possibilities between different origins and 
destinations as well as the own price elasticities of the supply of exports and 
demand for imports. 
In this regard, it is of interest to estimate the various elasticities of regional 
destinations or origins. The cross-price elasticity between regions i and j ,  given 
a constant level of exports (imports) and the share of export (import) in region 
j ,  sj, is obtained as 
E i  = E$ + s, Ef;,, 
where EkX is the own price elasticity of aggregate exports (imports) for a given 
fixed labor For the export (import) aggregator function, the four export 
destinations (import sources) were formed. Only a subset of Korea’s major 
trade partners was included: North American countries, Japan, the European 
Community, and the APEC countries excluding Japan and NAFTA countries. 
Domestic supply, capital demand, export supply, and import demand elastic- 
ities are presented in table 9A.2. Both export and import component own- 
supply elasticities are also listed in tables 9A.3 and 9A.4. 
29. The iterative Zellner SYSTEM command in SHAZAM (version 6) has been applied to each 
of the three linear systems to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. RESTRICT options were 
used to impose symmetry conditions. But the curvature properties of the production technology 
were not satisfied: for each system, the matrix of second-order partial derivatives was not positive 
semidefinite. With a reparameterization due to Wiley et al. (1973), the new parameters were esti- 
mated using the nonlinear command in SHAZAM. The systems converged from the differing 
starting coefficient values within 200 iterations. 
30. For details, see Diewert and Morrison (1988) and Kohli (1991). 
Table 9A.2 Net Output Elasticities 
XlPl X1P2 X1P3 X1P4 
0.1376 0.0882 -0.2738 0.0480 
0.1223 0.0808 -0.2405 0.0374 
0.1125 0.0755 -0.2206 0.0326 
0.1072 0.0733 -0.2093 0.0288 
0.1120 0.0748 -0.2165 0.0297 
0.1668 0.0686 -0.2763 0.0409 
0.1583 0.0609 -0.2566 0.0374 
0.1609 0.0577 -0.2563 0.0377 
0.1915 0.0633 -0.2966 0.0419 
0.2157 0.0694 -0.3308 0.0456 
0.2513 0.0723 -0.3752 0.05 16 
0.2414 0.0767 -0.3688 0.0507 
0.2409 0.0830 -0.3782 0.0543 
0.2183 0.0860 -0.3578 0.0535 
0.1994 0.08 11 -0.3286 0.0482 
0.2088 0.0751 -0.3294 0.0455 
0.1940 0.0730 -0.3088 0.04 17 
0.1862 0.0729 -0.2995 0.0404 
0.1852 0.0759 -0.3029 0.0417 
X2P 1 X2P2 X2P3 X2P4 
-0.0333 -0.0482 0.0984 -0.0 168 
-0.0302 -0.0489 0.0930 -0.0139 
-0.0283 -0.0489 0.0899 -0.0127 
-0.0263 -0.0511 0.0890 -0.0116 
-0.0283 -0.0486 0.0884 -0.0115 
-0.0443 -0.0287 0.0852 -0.0122 
-0.0438 -0.0259 0.08 1 1 -0.0114 
-0.0447 -0.0241 0.0802 -0.0114 
-0.0492 -0.0239 0.0847 -0.0116 
-0.0523 -0.0245 0.0887 -0.0118 
-0.0569 -0.0233 0.0926 -0.0123 
-0.0552 -0.0255 0.0932 -0.0124 
- 0.0546 -0.0279 0.0959 - 0.0 134 
-0.0510 -0.0311 0.0961 -0.0139 
-0.0485 -0.0310 0.0927 -0.0132 
-0.0507 -0.0275 0.0902 -0.012 1 
-0.0486 -0.0280 0.0880 -0.0115 
- 0.047 3 -0.0287 0.0874 -0.0114 
-0.0467 -0.0302 0.0887 -0.01 18 
X3P1 X3P2 X3P3 X3P4 
-1.9131 -1.8182 4.5532 -0.8218 
-2.0766 -2.1455 5.0148 -0.7927 
-2.1212 -2.3076 5.2058 -0.7769 
-2.2497 -2.6632 5.6992 -0.7862 
-2.1058 -2.2705 5.0755 -0.6992 
-1.6719 -0.7979 2.9112 -0.4414 
Table 9A.2 (continued) 
X3P1 X3P2 X3P3 X3P4 
- 1.6765 
- 1.6879 
- 1.5953 
- 1.5426 
- 1.4688 
- 1.4776 
- 1.4808 
-1.5137 
- 1.5482 
- 1.5214 
- 1.5436 
- 1.5584 
- 1.5640 
-0.7365 
-0.6817 
-0.5856 
-0.5489 
-0.4604 
-0.5186 
-0.5702 
-0.6850 
-0.7292 
-0.6174 
-0.6616 
-0.7012 
-0.7440 
2.8363 
2.7906 
2.5496 
2.4352 
2.2454 
2.3227 
2.4049 
2.5971 
2.6793 
2.4904 
2.5578 
2.6195 
2.6854 
-0.4233 
-0.4209 
-0.3687 
-0.3437 
-0.3163 
-0.3264 
-0.3539 
-0.3984 
- 0.401 9 
-0.3516 
-0.3526 
-0.3599 
-0.3775 
X4P 1 X4P2 X4P3 X4P4 
-0.3508 
-0.3019 
-0.2677 
-0.2411 
-0.2389 
-0.3110 
-0.2872 
-0.2758 
-0.2930 
-0.3009 
-0.3 160 
-0.2954 
-0.2818 
-0.2544 
-0.2333 
-0.2337 
-0.2172 
-0.2056 
-0.2176 
-0.3249 
-0.2998 
-0.2783 
-0.2705 
-0.2447 
-0.1438 
-0.1223 
-0.1081 
-0.1042 
-0,1036 
-0.0960 
-0.1003 
-0.1052 
-0.11 17 
-0.1064 
-0.0917 
-0.0899 
-0.0892 
-0.0999 
0.8598 
0.7407 
0.6635 
0.6118 
0.5781 
0.5547 
0.4976 
0.4675 
0.4796 
0.4860 
0.4947 
0.4750 
0.4690 
0.4477 
0.4133 
0.3909 
0.3672 
0.3523 
0.3811 
-0.1842 
-0.1390 
-0.1 175 
-0.1002 
-0.0945 
-0.0998 
-0.0881 
-0.0837 
-0.0823 
-0.0814 
-0.0827 
-0.0792 
-0.0819 
-0.08 15 
-0.0736 
-0.0655 
-0.0601 
-0.0574 
-0.0636 
- 
Note: X1 = domestic sales, X2 = capital formation, X3 = exports, and X4 = imports. Pl-P4 
represent respective price indexes. 
Table 9A.3 Export Destination Elasticities 
EXlPl EX 1 P2 EX 1 P3 EX 1 P4 
6.378 1 -0.4450 -0.4326 -0.9472 
6.5705 -0.3198 -0.4002 -0.8357 
6.3753 -0.2073 -0.2877 -0.6745 
6.4301 -0.0376 -0.2051 -0.4883 
5.9875 -0.1624 -0.3040 -0.4456 
5.4895 -0.8391 -0.8701 -0.8691 
5.4300 -0.8716 -0.8901 -0.8319 
5.4027 -0.8462 -0.9552 -0.8108 
5.5061 -1.0127 - 1.0950 -0.8488 
5.7156 -1.1430 - 1.2207 -0.9167 
5.7742 - 1.2298 - 1.3245 -0.9745 
5.0614 -0.9500 -1.0761 -0.7126 
5.0858 -0.9412 - 1.0748 -0.6649 
5.3824 -0.9986 -1.1249 -0.6618 
5.3004 -0.9474 - 1.0950 -0.5787 
5.2286 -1.0005 -1.1470 -0.5908 
5.3616 - 1.0462 -1.1842 -0.5733 
5.4404 - 1.0677 - 1.2062 -0.5470 
5.3523 -0.9982 -1.1221 -0.5465 
EX2P 1 EX2P2 EX2P3 EX2P4 
-0.6927 
-0.5391 
-0.4210 
-0.1758 
-0.5289 
- 1.6937 
- 1.7599 
-1.9014 
-2.0391 
-2.1097 
-2.1942 
-2.3156 
-2.3581 
-2.2857 
-2.3474 
-2.4947 
-2.5114 
-2.5494 
-2.3852 
2. I365 
2.2223 
2.2365 
2.2942 
2.1807 
1.7774 
1.7703 
1.7589 
1.7340 
1.7082 
1.6497 
1.7049 
1.7402 
1.7746 
1.8089 
1.7921 
1.8184 
1.8433 
1.8336 
1.8928 
2.0168 
2.0164 
2.1196 
1.9874 
1.5660 
1.5476 
1.5970 
1.5530 
1.5273 
1.4890 
1.5582 
1.5904 
1.6066 
1.6497 
1.6346 
1.6443 
1.6610 
1.6468 
1.2165 
1.3148 
1.3738 
1.4611 
1.4362 
1.2614 
1.2783 
1.3361 
1.3017 
1.3093 
1.3010 
1.3752 
1.4324 
1.5016 
1.5681 
1.5583 
1.6066 
1.6646 
1.5902 
EX3P1 EX3P2 EX3P3 EX3P4 
- 1.0430 2.1249 2.0872 1.3840 
-0.9240 2.2155 2.2314 1.4919 
-0.8404 2.2377 2.2453 1.5631 
-0.6694 2.3081 2.3886 1.6718 
- 1.0773 2.2102 2.2808 1.6619 
-2.1739 1.7960 1.8201 1.4689 
Table 9A.3 (continued) 
EX3P1 EX3P2 EX3P3 EX3P4 
-2.2574 
-2.4548 
-2.5999 
-2.6584 
-2.7242 
-2.9851 
-3.0804 
-2.9949 
- 3.1294 
-3.3207 
-3.3640 
-3.4430 
-3.2008 
1.7948 
1.7913 
1.7728 
1.7452 
1.6813 
1.7682 
1.8171 
1.8503 
1.9022 
1.8980 
1.9338 
1.9705 
1.9404 
1.8090 
1.8884 
1.8493 
1.8183 
1.7726 
1.9054 
1.9610 
1.9694 
2.0458 
2.0507 
2.0705 
2.1039 
2.0565 
1.4899 
1.5657 
1.5273 
1.5301 
1.5157 
1.6342 
1.7072 
1.7723 
1.8607 
1.8623 
1.9175 
1.988 1 
1.8892 
EX4PI EX4P2 EX4P3 EX4P4 
-3.9850 
-3.3163 
-2.7653 
-2.2662 
-2.1539 
-2.5837 
-2.3121 
-2.1694 
-2.0437 
-1.8881 
- 1.7779 
-1.6120 
- 1.4463 
- 1.2464 
- 1.0970 
- 1.0828 
-0.9764 
-0.8773 
-1.0001 
3.0855 
2.9759 
2.8475 
2.7990 
2.5408 
1.9134 
1.7948 
1.6805 
1.5708 
1.4720 
1.3524 
1.3018 
1.265 1 
1.2578 
1.2193 
1.1455 
1.1265 
1.1029 
1.1908 
3.0496 
3.0331 
2.8823 
2.9297 
2.6334 
1.929 1 
1,7942 
1.7494 
1.6130 
1.5054 
1.395 1 
1.3621 
1.3187 
1.2894 
1.2539 
1.1789 
1.1452 
1.1129 
1.2042 
2.4032 
2.3221 
2.2412 
2.2366 
2.0552 
1.6524 
1.5594 
1.5301 
1.4095 
1.3460 
1.2758 
1,2707 
1.2674 
1.2963 
1.3031 
1.2488 
1.2626 
1.2810 
1.2906 
Note: EX1 = exports to NAFTA, EX2 = exports to Japan, EX3 = exports to the European Com- 
munity, and EX4 = exports to APEC 11. Pl-P4 represent respective price indexes. 
Table 9A.4 Import Origin Elasticities 
IMlPl IMlP2 IMIP3 im1p4 
-2.4447 
-4.0784 
-4.3142 
-4.0263 
-3.6365 
-3.0375 
-3.1646 
-2.4865 
-2.8802 
-2.9372 
-3.1176 
-3.8738 
-3.8085 
-3.7923 
-3.5618 
-3.3267 
-3.3472 
-3.0848 
- 3.3 172 
2.6256 
4.2927 
4.5380 
4.2416 
3.8423 
3.2619 
3.3938 
2.6476 
3.0516 
3.1063 
3.3036 
4.0197 
3.9464 
3.9176 
3.6860 
3.4640 
3.4849 
3.2147 
3.4602 
-0.0054 
0.022 1 
0.0270 
0.0255 
0.0197 
0.0129 
0.0163 
0.0126 
0.0178 
0.0175 
0.0189 
0.03 11 
0.0288 
0.0288 
0.0261 
0.0245 
0.0256 
0.0230 
0.0243 
-0.3597 
-0.3754 
-0.3683 
-0.3410 
-0.3201 
-0.3371 
-0.3336 
-0.2574 
-0.2714 
-0.2681 
-0.2876 
-0.2562 
-0.2486 
-0.2357 
-0.2239 
-0.2273 
-0.2234 
-0.2103 
-0.2309 
IM2P1 IM2P2 IM2P3 1m2p4 
1.3707 
1.3864 
1.4390 
1.506 1 
1.5836 
1.6877 
1.7591 
1.9272 
1.9679 
2.0646 
2.1465 
2.1575 
2.2785 
2.4083 
2.5943 
2.8216 
3.0063 
3.3422 
2.8223 
-1.7516 
- 1.6360 
- 1.6630 
-1.7187 
- 1.8024 
-1.9613 
-2.0190 
-2.1951 
-2.2176 
-2.3146 
-2.4059 
-2.3547 
-2.4816 
-2.6099 
-2.8022 
-3.0527 
-3.2404 
-3.5995 
-3.0563 
-0.0190 
-0.0145 
- 0.0 124 
- 0.0 105 
-0.0100 
-0.0 105 
-0.0093 
-0.0085 
-0.0086 
-0.0088 
-0.0091 
-0.0090 
-0.0095 
-0.0097 
-0.0084 
-0.0070 
-0.0060 
-0.0053 
-0.0066 
0.2157 
0.1251 
0.1188 
0.1229 
0.1343 
0.1844 
0.1811 
0.1927 
0.1760 
0.1774 
0.1857 
0.1270 
0.1308 
0.1297 
0.1427 
0.1726 
0.1801 
0.205 1 
0.1770 
IM3P1 IM3P2 IM3P3 1m3p4 
-0.0097 -0.095 1 -0.1451 0.0658 
0.0396 -0.0783 -0.1409 0.0407 
0.0452 -0.0638 -0.1353 0.0363 
0.0452 -0.0504 -0.1298 0.0348 
0.0391 -0.0442 -0.1240 0.0346 
0.0278 -0.0426 -0.1277 0.0427 
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Table 9A.4 (continued) 
IM3Pl IM3P2 IM3P3 im3p4 
0.0327 
0.0309 
0.0373 
0.0362 
0.0361 
0.0499 
0.0471 
0.0466 
0.0448 
0.0434 
0.0447 
0.0425 
0.0435 
-0.0357 
-0.0287 
-0.0289 
-0.0274 
-0.0274 
-0.0276 
-0.0273 
-0.0257 
-0.0203 
-0.0152 
-0.0122 
-0.0094 
-0.0144 
-0.1247 
-0.1211 
-0.1219 
-0.1186 
-0.1194 
-0.1185 
-0.1166 
-0.1147 
-0.1105 
-0.1085 
-0.1069 
-0.1045 
-0.1085 
0.0395 
0.0353 
0.03 11 
0.0284 
0.0280 
0.0170 
0.0149 
0.0123 
0.0124 
0.0 147 
0.0143 
0.0139 
0.0158 
IM4P1 IM4P2 IM4P3 rh44P4 
- 1.2908 1.4004 0.0787 -0.3725 
- 1.4337 1.4488 0.0842 -0.2383 
- 1.2228 1.223 1 0.0698 -0.1877 
-1.0183 1.0168 0.0569 -0.1556 
-0.8591 0.8570 0.0454 -0.1378 
-0.7084 0.7 184 0.0375 -0.1472 
-0.6549 0.6613 0.0345 -0.1290 
-0.5601 0.5556 0.0285 -0.1077 
-0.5476 0.5343 0.0270 -0.0960 
-0.5154 0.4984 0.0237 -0.0882 
-0.4905 0.4721 0.0216 -0.0859 
-0,4976 0.4609 0.0209 -0.0634 
-0,4692 0.4298 0.0178 -0.0603 
-0.4465 0.4050 0.0157 - 0.05 5 8 
-0.4170 0.3819 0.0146 -0.0530 
-0.3886 0.3623 0.0142 -0.0534 
-0.3716 0.3480 0.0138 -0.0503 
-0.3496 0.3282 0.0126 -0.0487 
-0.3870 0.3628 0.0145 -0.0539 
Nure: IM1 = imports from NAFTA, IM2 = imports from Japan, IM3 = imports from the Euro- 
pean Community, and IM4 = imports from APEC 11. Pl-P4 represent respective price indexes. 
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Comment Tain-Jy Chen 
This is a comprehensive study of possible impacts of NAFTA on Korea. I en- 
joyed reading it and agreed with its major conclusion; that is, NAFTA is not 
likely to have a major impact on Korea’s trade with the United States. In fact, 
a study conducted by the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research on 
NAFTA’s impact on Taiwan reached a similar conclusion. The underlying rea- 
son for this conclusion is that the trade structures of Mexico and Korea (or 
Taiwan) are dissimilar, and therefore, the likely diversion arising from trade 
Tain-Jy Chen is professor of economics at National Taiwan University and a consultant to the 
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. 
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preferences extended by the United States to Mexico is minimal. My com- 
ments are focused on a few specific points made, and some points not men- 
tioned, in the paper. 
The export structure of Korea has shifted rapidly over time, particularly in 
the 1980s. The share of NAFTA countries in Korea’s export decreased and 
that of East Asian countries increased. The author attributes this to changing 
comparative advantage and foreign direct investment (FDI). Although this rea- 
soning seems plausible, it can not explain Korea’s rising exports to Singapore. 
There may be other reasons. Did policy not matter at all? For example, how 
much of this change can be attributed to the U.S. repeal of the General System 
of Preferences for Korea in January 1989? And to what degree is Korea’s trade 
diversification effort a response to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty 
cases filed against Korea? How much of Korean FDI in the United States can 
be said to be a response to the formation of NAFTA? 
Although the author generally believes that trade diversion is small, in sec- 
tion 9.3.2, he calculates the degree of trade diversion based on export price 
elasticities and comes up with some fairly big numbers. For example, trade 
diversion for leather products amounts to 5.1 percent of trade volume in 1992, 
and for textiles and apparel, 4.4 percent. There seems to be a conceptual prob- 
lem in using price elasticities based on the assumption of perfect competition. 
If the export market were a perfectly competitive market, then tariff preference 
in favor of Mexican products would wipe out all exports from Korea. An im- 
perfect competition model within the framework of differentiated products 
seems to be more suitable for measuring the trade diversion effect. In that 
model, the degree of substitution between Mexican and Korean products mat- 
ters. I wonder whether the assumption used here, that is, that a 1 percent tariff 
preference for Mexico leads to a 0.5 percent decrease in export price for Ko- 
rean products, overestimates the substitutability. 
The author correctly points out the potential damage of investment diver- 
sion. He concludes that investment diversion among U.S. multinationals is 
likely to be small because the maquiladora program has been in place for many 
years. His conclusion on investment diversion among multinationals based 
elsewhere is unclear, however. My personal view is that the latter investment 
diversion effect could be substantial. Fears of trade protectionism coupled with 
rules of origin and regional content regulations may encourage substantial FDI 
from non-NAFTA countries, not only to Mexico, but to the United States and 
Canada as well. If this occurs, the agglomeration effect will make Mexican 
industries more competitive in a dynamic sense, and the trade diversion effect 
that we deemphasize today may loom larger in the future, particularly in high- 
technology areas. For that matter, I wonder what Hyundai will do if it pulls out 
of Canada? Will it not consider investing in Mexico? 
It is recognized in the paper that the rules of origin embedded in NAFTA 
are important protectionist measures. It would have been nice had the paper 
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presented an estimate of this hidden protective measure, that is, the equivalent 
tariff. From this, the paper could also have measured the adverse effect of these 
rules of origin on Korean exports of automobile parts and textile products. 
The paper argues that it is the lack of structural linkage between Korea and 
NAFTA that contributes to the declining share of Korean exports going to 
NAFTA. But the paper also estimates that each dollar of Korea’s export to the 
United States generates 44-56 cents of “induced import” from the United 
States. This can hardly justify the “lack” of structural linkage. Does Korea 
have a stronger structural linkage with Japan? Presumably. But Korea’s export 
to Japan does not seem to have increased much in recent years. The meaning 
of the term “structural linkage” needs to be clarified and its relationship with 
trade explained. 
Since the paper focuses on the negative impact of NAFTA, it may only be 
fair to also mention some possible positive impacts of NAFTA on Korea. 
